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Glossary of Spanish and Chilean Terms
callampas : Shanty-towns on the margins of cities, especially Santiago. Typically
lacking adequate infrastructure and sanitation with makeshift homes.
cerros : Literally means “hills,” but are tight-knit communities with varying class
distinctions to which inhabitants generally feel great loyalty,
especially in Valparaíso.
garrote: Literally translates to “stick,” but is most closely associated with the batons the
Carabineros used as weapons, often against civlians. The word carries
with it the themes of oppression, abuse and police brutality.
hacienda: Large plantations where inquilinos work under a latifundista or a patrón.
These were the most obvious remenents of the colonial period in Latin
America.
Ibañista : Supporter of General Ibáñez, sometimes in an extreme and militant form.
inquilinos: Referring to tenant-laborers in a hacienda. Although not legally bound to
the land as European serfs were in the feudal system, they typically
owed enormous debts to landlords and the status was generally
hereditary such that it was feudal-like in nature.
latifundista: Land or estate owner, acts as landlord to inquillinos. See patron.
nacista : Member of the National Socialist Movement in the 1930s; Nazi sympathizer.
patrón : Land owner or boss, like latifundista but can also refer to a factory owner.
pobladores : This word comes from “pobres” which refers to the poor, but in Chile it
specifically refers to pobres who have come together in some form of
activity, typically in protest.
pueblo : Translates to town, nation or people, but most often refers to common-folk
and marginalized groups in society, ie., the working class.
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I. El Once, The Most Tragic Day for Chilean Democracy
On May 21, 1971, President Salvador Allende Gossens* gave his first official
address to Congress as the newly elected president of Chile. Allende, a socialist, was a
revolutionary figure as the world’s first freely elected Marxist president.1 The fact that a
socialist rose to power by the means of a popular election was unprecedented, and free
market capitalists in Chile and around the world felt threatened; Allende’s election
implied both popular support for Marxism and showed that revolution could occur
without bloodshed, suggesting a peaceful road to socialism. Indeed, Allende’s goal was
to prove that this peaceful road was possible in a country where constitutionalism
prevailed. He was, in fact, a strong believer in the integrity of Chile’s constitutional
democracy. Along with this belief came his trust in the loyalty of the country’s armed
forces, despite the fact that there had been several military uprisings throughout the
twentieth century.
In the early 1970s, many Chileans shared Allende’s belief that the armed forces,
both the military and the Carabineros (the national police force), would not interfere in
the political sphere, even in the event of a transition to socialism. Contemporary scholars
often describe this misled conviction as the “myth of professionalism” of the armed
forces.2 President Allende reinforced his trust in his armed forces in his first address to
Congress:

* Spanish last names can often be confusing, and that is because they do not use them as “last
names” in the way that English speakers do. Rather they are called apellidos, which roughly
translates to surnames. The first one (Allende in this case) comes from the father and the
second (Gossens) comes from the mother. When referring to them after the initial
introduction, it is customary to use just the first surname for convenience unless other
relevant characters make this confusing. Thus, after giving his full name, Salvador Allende
Gossnes will be referred to simply as Salvador Allende. They also frequently use first names in
conjunction with middle names (eg. Juan Pablo), and in this case both are considered part of
the first name.

5

It has been emphatically claimed that the armed forces and the Carabineros, the
supporters till now of the institutional order which we shall overcome, would not
agree to support the will of the people in their decision to build socialism in our
country. But they do not take into account the patriotism of our armed forces and
the Carabineros, their traditional professionalism and their submission to civil
authority.3
In this first address to Congress, Allende demonstrated a belief that the “traditional
professionalism” of these armed forces would prove greater than their loyalty to the
“institutional order,” i.e., the democratic system used to protect and support the Chilean
capitalism. Like many Chileans, the new president had fallen victim to the myth of
professionalism.
Two years later, on the morning of September 11, 1973, a telephone call woke
President Allende at 6:30 am with disturbing news. A minister in the Moneda, the
presidential palace in the capital, Santiago, informed the president that the navy was in
rebellion and occupying Valparaíso, Chile’s second largest city and most active port.
Forty-five minutes later, Allende cautiously exited his home with a helmet on his head
and a machine gun in his hand along with twenty-seven members of the Grupo de
Armada de Protección (GAP). This group of highly trained sharpshooters, offering
support to the Allende’s smaller personal escort, then loaded the president into a convoy
and left for the Moneda.4
When they arrived at the presidential palace, nothing seemed out of place. Just
after 8:00 am, however, Allende received a telephone call from his air force aid, Colonel
Roberto Sánchez, on behalf of the military junta* that was responsible for the uprising.
Colonel Sánchez told the president that the junta was prepared to take control of Chile by
force and that a plane was ready to transport Allende and his family out of the country as
*

A military junta can be generically defined as a coalition of upper ranking military officials that
control (or seek to control) a government. These juntas have taken various forms, in number and
structure, throughout Chile’s history.
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soon as he agreed to resign. Allende reportedly responded: “I am the President, and it is
here at the Moneda that I am going to remain….As traitorous generals, you are incapable
of knowing what honorable men are like.”5 Allende’s courageous decision to stand in the
face of this threat exemplified his steadfast belief in upholding constitutional democracy,
a conviction that he would have contradicted by surrendering to the golpe, or coup. He
also believed that some members of the armed forces would remain loyal to his
administration, especially the Carabineros. Indeed, Carlos Ibáñez del Campo created this
national police force forty-six years earlier intending to implement a defense against this
exact type of uprising from the military.
For a series of historical and bureaucratic reasons, Allende had reasons for hope
in the Carabineros. First of all, they answered directly to the Ministry of the Interior, the
section of government that worked most closely with the executive office. Chile lacks a
vice-president, so the minister of the interior is next in line assume control of the
executive branch should the president become indisposed. Furthermore, while the
Chilean president has always been the commander-in-chief, the loyalty of the military
was most frequently in the hands of the generals in the Department of War. The
military’s particular sense of institutional loyalty, based in their strong tradition and the
autonomous nature, was uniquely powerful in Chile and made the members of the armed
forces very susceptible to manipulation from their commanders. The Carabineros were
the only legally armed civilian force in Chile, a force that the dictator Carlos Ibáñez
created in 1927 as a defense against the power of the Department of War by tying their
institutional loyalty directly to the executive branch.
Allende felt secure among the Carabineros because of their direct tie to the
executive and their often peasant and working-class origins, a background that he
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mistakenly believed would make them loyal to his socialist mission. Marc Cooper, a
journalist from the United States who worked for Allende, described the importance of
this background in his memoirs: “The carabineros* were generally from workers’ families
and often lived in substandard housing in squatters’ villages – areas almost unanimously
sympathetic to the Socialists and Communists.”6 Even if the majority of the 75,000
members of the army, navy and air force rebelled, Allende believed that the 25,000730,0008 Carabineros could defend his government, especially with the aid of popular
mobilization, if they remained loyal to their duty.
On the morning of the coup, this police force initially maintained an outward
appearance of loyalty to the president.9 At about 8:30 am, however, General Director of
the Carabineros José María Sepúlveda noticed that something was amiss among his
officers; while the general went about reinforcing the palace security, “his subordinates
lacked their usual respect and hesitated at his orders.”10 This was highly unusual for the
Carabineros, an institution that prided itself on maintaining a strict chain of command and
obedience to orders.
As it turns out, two other Carabineros generals, César Mendoza and Arturo
Yovane, had for several days been secretly persuading many members of the officer
corps to participate in the coming coup. At about 8:30 am, Mendoza revealed that he was
assuming command of the Carabineros when he and the other members of the junta
broadcasted an official proclamation of military rule. In this proclamation, they told
Allende to “immediately relinquish his authority to the armed forces and the Carabineros
of Chile.”11 By specifically naming the Carabineros in the proclamation, the junta
explicitly stated that the police had joined the coup, although the extent to which this was
*

The choice to capitalize Carabineros or not often varies in scholarly works, but most Chilean
newspapers do not. In this paper, I do not capitalize it if the cited excerpt does not.
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true remained to be seen at the time of the broadcast. It did not take long, however, for
Allende to realize that the majority of the Carabineros were, in fact, following Mendoza.
At about 8:55 am, Allende met with General Sepúlveda and some other senior
commanders of the Carabineros in his office. They informed the president that the junta
had seized the Carabineros headquarters, that they could not communicate with Mendoza,
and that nearly all of the three hundred Carabineros palace guards had joined the
besiegers. An eyewitness from the GAP, the president’s personal protection force, who
was at Allende’s guard recounted that “there was division among the upper commands
which led to chaos,” while others reported that some of these senior commanders said
they would not stay to defend the president, perhaps out of cowardice.12 Nathaniel Davis,
the U.S. ambassador to Chile who was present in Santiago during the coup, wrote in his
account that, instead of cowardice, “It is more likely…that they knew their troops would
no longer follow them.”13 Those accounts and the Carabineros’ departure from the palace
reveal that Mendoza and the junta did indeed have the loyalty, or at least the obedience,
of most of the police and a significant number of the commanding officers.
A small few indecisive Carabineros actually remained at the Moneda when
Allende’s meeting with the senior Carabineros ended at about 9:00 am.14 Despite these
lingerers, it was clear to the president that enough of the police would abandon him that
he would have no adequate line of defense against the combined military forces. At this
point, the success of the coup seemed inevitable, and at 9:10 am, President Allende gave
his final address to the Chilean people over the independent Radio Magallanes:*
This is surely the last opportunity I will have to address you. The Air Force
has bombed the towers of Radio Portales and Corporación. My words are not
*

The air force had destroyed every other pro-government radio station earlier that day, but Radio
Magallanes transmitted from a mobile location and thus remained intact for several more hours than
other pro-Allende transmissions.
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bitter but they are full of disillusionment. And they will serve as moral
sanction for those who have betrayed their oath of loyalty: the soldiers of Chile,
the branch commanders….Mr. Mendoza, a slinking general who only yesterday
swore his loyalty to the government, who has proclaimed himself head of the
Carabineros….I will not resign….With my life I will pay for defending the
principles of our nation….History cannot be stopped by repression or
violence….Long live Chile! Long live the people! Long live the workers! These
are my last words….15
Allende’s disappointment over the disloyalty of his armed forces was obvious in his final
words to his beloved country. His indignation toward the Carabineros and their betrayal
was particularly apparent in the words he directed at General Mendoza, to whom the
Carabineros now showed their allegiance. His words also showed that his own loyalty to
the constitutional government was completely unwavering, and for this reason he chose
to stay in the Moneda until his eventual death.
For about an hour after 9:00 am, some remaining Carabineros palace guards
“hesitated and conferred among themselves,”16 until the junta commanders gave them a
final ultimatum to abandon the Moneda or suffer attack. They departed the palace
grounds, destroyed any weaponry inside the palace that they could not carry with them,
and soon the last of the police abandoned the palace.17 At about 9:30 am, following
Allende’s final words, the junta opened fire on the Moneda while the forty or so
defenders of the palace, mostly members of the GAP, returned shots. Even the president
himself fought against the junta forces, using an AK-47 that Fidel Castro had given to
him two years earlier.18 At about this time, President Allende gave his blessing to anyone
who wanted to save his life in retreat. Juan Seoane, the head of the president’s personal
security, recalled the situation:
When I arrived at the Moneda we were the better off. The palace was
defended by the Carabineros’ tanquetas,* that shortly afterward became the
*

These are small and more mobile tanks used by the Carabineros. They usually have wheels instead
of the tracks used by larger tanks and are often used to spray gas in order to disperse groups of
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besiegers….We did not have personnel to defend the palace, since only we
remained at the security of the president. After the retreat of the Carabineros
we remained alone and this made it so that we had no possibility of
defending the building [my emphasis]….I did not see hysteria or people who
wanted to leave, only calmness and dignity, especially in the president, who
had to know very well what was going to happen.19
If there was any doubt that the Allende needed the Carabineros to defend the palace, then
Seoane disproved it. As the head of the president’s security, surely he knew better than
anyone what was needed to defend against the junta’s forces. Furthermore, if the
Carabineros had demonstrated widespread loyalty to Allende they could have influenced
some members of the military who were unsure about where their loyalties lay. Still, the
remaining defenders of the palace successfully fought off the military for as long as they
could.
Dr. Danilo Bartulin was inside the presidential office in the Moneda that morning
and he recalled that most of the armed forces surrounding the palace directed their firing
at that section of the building. Likewise, most of the defense forces were in the same
section, firing bazookas out of the windows, destroying at least two tanks. Dr. Bartulin
recalls the battle as “heartening,” because the junta forces appeared to retreat slightly as
they suffered casualties and the destruction of those two tanks.20 For a time, the defense
of the Moneda proved successful primarily because of the building’s structure. It was
built like a fortress in the eighteenth century, and its three-foot thick walls meant that
ground forces alone would not easily destroy it.21
The fatal turning point came, however, at 11:52 am, when the first of several
Hawker Hunter aircrafts* turned behind San Cristóbal Hill, about three miles northeast of
people without fatality. This account, however, certainly refers to tanquetas that were capable of
lobbing artillery.
*
These aircrafts were developed and built in Great Britain, but they were part of the Chilean air
force, piloted by members of the Chilean military. Claims exist that U.S. pilots flew these planes, but
the evidence overwhelmingly favors the contrary.
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the palace, went into a steep dive, and launched Sura P-3 missiles with incredible
accuracy at the north wall of the Moneda. At least six more missiles followed, setting the
palace aflame.22 (See Appendix 1 for a photo of the Moneda after the bombing.) Those
who knew Ernesto Amador González Yarra, the pilot of the first plane to fire on the
palace and the son of a Carabineros officer, said that he “felt pride about his actions until
the day of his death,”23 a sentiment indicative of the righteousness many soldiers felt
about the coup. This attitude of the common soldier reveals that not just power hungry
officers in the military perpetrated the coup, although the loyalty in the lower ranks was
far more divided.
The military ground forces entered the palace at about 1:30 pm, and many on the
ground floor immediately began to surrender. Allende ordered everyone who remained at
his side to do the same, hoping to spare their lives. All but five obeyed, and at
approximately 2:20 pm, the junta forces killed Allende and all who had remained at his
side.24 Thus, the golpe of September 11, 1973, came to a close, the first successful
military coup in Chile since 1924.* It bears noting that the specific details of the
president’s death remain shrouded by contradictory stories of assassination and suicide,
see Appendix 2 for more details on this matter.
Why was it that Allende stood virtually alone in the protection of Chilean
democracy? The military’s betrayal makes sense given that many of its commanders were
known fascists with little history of loyalty to the president or the constitutional process,
including General Augusto Pinochet, who was deeply involved in the events and
established a seventeen-year dictatorship following the coup. The Carabineros were a
different case, however, because their original purpose was to act as a deterrent to

*

There were several attempted golpes between 1924 and 1973, but none of them proved successful.
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military adventurism. So why did these police, who answered directly to the president’s
office, abandon their historic duty in September 1973?
The answer to this question is really quite simple: by 1973 the Carabineros had
fundamentally changed as an institution, such that they viewed Marxism as the greater
threat to Chile than a military coup. This made them predisposed to join the military,
which they had come to trust, in overthrowing Allende’s socialist government. How and
why the Carabineros institution changed in this way between 1927 and 1973 – which is
the focus of this paper – is a much more complex issue. As the identity of Carabineros
institution evolved, they began perceiving the military as less of a threat because it
stopped interfering with Chile’s democratic process; in searching for a new enemy, this
national police force found Marxism because every president before Allende (1970-1973)
ordered them to oppress the working class, which they generally perceived as inherently
Marxist. To best understand this progression, it is necessary to begin examining the
context in which Carlos Ibáñez consolidated this national police force in the first place.
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II. The Instability of the 1920s and the Birth of the Carabineros
President Carlos Ibáñez created the Carabineros in 1927 during one of the
unstable decades in the history of Chilean politics. Economic downturn following the end
of World War I and growing unrest from the proletariat, which organized itself into
formal parties and moved toward Marxism in the early 20th century, caused widespread
outcry for drastic changes in the Chilean government. This made the 1920s a ripe
environment for armed insurrection from the military, which came in September 1924
and began nearly a decade of uncertainty about the stability of Chilean democracy and
mistrust toward the armed forces. This uncertainty and mistrust directly led to the
creation of the Carabineros, a new force that aimed at stabilizing politics by pacifying the
military through deterrence. That is, the military was less likely to intervene with the
well-armed Carabineros defending government. Before expanding on this theme, it is
first important to briefly examine the specific causes of the unstable 1920s.
Before 1924, the most recent instance of armed struggle in Chile was the 1891
civil war, a dispute between Congress and the executive that began after President José
Manuel Balmaceda Fernández (1886-1891) attempted to block a British monopoly over
nitrate mining. Nitrate, used around the world for fertilizer, became Chile’s most
important economic asset after the War of the Pacific (1879-1883) when the nation
acquired mines previously owned by Bolivia and Peru. (See Appendix 3 for a map of
territorial changes.) The Chilean government allowed Europeans and North Americans to
build and operate their own mines, setting a precedent for Chile’s lasting dependence on
foreign investment. The success of nitrate mining benefitted only the economic elite and
political participation was limited to the educated, white men who mostly made up this

economic elite.* This limited political participation meant that there were only two major
political parties at this time in Chile, the Liberals and Conservatives. These two parties
banded together in the 1891 civil war, and from henceforth can be considered one
political bloc. (Refer to Appendix 4 throughout for a breakdown of Chilean political
parties.)
Congress went to war against President Balmaceda in 1891 because they wished
to continue reaping the benefits of nitrate mining without government interference. When
Congress won after nine months of bloody confrontation, they began thirty-three years of
laissez-faire economics that brought incredible wealth to a select few Chileans, and great
macro-economic growth, while the lower and middle classes suffered. This era of
economic growth and relative political stability, known as the parliamentary era, also
gave unbalanced power to Congress vis-à-vis the executive because the senators’ postwar
reinterpretation of the 1833 Constitution gave them the right to dissolve presidential
cabinets. Over the next thirty years, the Liberals and Conservatives in Congress dissolved
the presidential cabinet over 120 times,1 a testament to their virtually unchallenged
authority.
The economic success of foreign investment accelerated urbanization, yielded
government investment in education and generally seemed to pull Chile into modernity.
But these topical developments masked the poor living conditions of the urban lower
class, living mostly in five by eight meter rooms called conventillos that held up to eight
inhabitants. They received little aid from the government and the growing cities lacked
*

There are two things worth noting here. First, the primary blockade for lower-class suffrage was
literacy requirements. In 1890, the literacy rate in Chile was only 29% (Faúndez, 5). Secondly, the
distinction of class based on race, the Casta system, was historically important in all of Latin America
and blocked many with indigenous or African blood from political rights. Different combinations fell
into varying levels in the social hierarchy. Examples include criollos (100% white but born in the
Americas), mestizos (one white parent, one native), and mulatos (one white parent, one African). The
stigmatisms associated with the classifications often carry over into modern society even today.
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the infrastructure and sanitation to provide humane living conditions. In Santiago, the
capital, government did not begin construction of a sewer system until 1903 and many of
its citizens remained without water until 1920.2 In 1905, the popular newspaper El
Mecurio described Chile’s second largest city, Valparaíso, as “infected, fetid, pestilent,
with its streets covered with a thin layer of fermenting filth.” In 1909 it commented again
on the city: “The Spanish language, so rich in its words, does not have words sufficient to
describe such a pigsty with accuracy.”3 Thus, the parliamentary era and its economic
growth proved beneficial only to the economic elite who could afford to escape these
conditions.
The result was Chile’s first widespread labor mobilization. Between 1902 and
1908 there were over 200 strikes.4 The government responded with violent oppression. In
May 1903, over one thousand people died when the military shot protestors during a port
workers’ strike in Valparaíso. In October 1905, three hundred upper-class “white guards”
armed by the government killed over two hundred citizens protesting in response to high
meat prices. Then, in 1907, the government dispatched two naval cruisers that opened
machine gun fire on the port city of Iquique where several thousand nitrate miners were
on strike. The number of dead remains unknown, but is estimated to be in the hundreds.5
These early acts of oppression served as a precedent for later violence against the
working class, a role that the Carabineros would come to fill.
Only the rural poor failed to organize and fight for social change. This was
because of the prevailing hacienda system wherein the large landowners, the latifundistas,
maintained political dominion over their landed peasants, the inquilinos. These inquilinos
were not bounded to the land as in European feudalism, but were often indebted to the
landowner or worked the land for housing and food. Because this status often passed
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from one generation the next, the hacienda system resembled serfdom more than a free
labor market. As a result, the peasantry had neither the wherewithal nor the ability to
fight back against their exploitation because their livelihood was subject to the will of
their landowners. Furthermore, these landowners made up a large portion of Congress
and had maintained enough political influence to block any major land reforms. Chile did
not see any legitimate attempts at changing this system for several decades.
Ultimately, government repression galvanized the nation’s labor forces instead of
suppressing their outcry. A Chilean lawyer founded the Federación de Obreros de Chile
(FOCH) in 1909, a federation of Chilean workers. Then, in 1910, four hundred artisan
associations joined with a number of unions that were mostly made up of railway men
and metal workers to form the mancomunales, labor brotherhoods. These mancomunales
took control of the FOCH over the next several years, turning it into a predominantly
socialist organization.6 Other Marixst-oriented groups sprang up at this time as well,
including the Socialist Workers Party (POS), founded in 1912 by Luis Emilio
Recabarren,7 and a branch of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) in 1919.8 These
labor movements’ increasing influence on political affairs came at an inconvenient time
for the nation’s elite capitalists as Chile began to face serious economic turmoil
immediately following the end of the First World War.
In 1919, immediately following the end of World War I, nitrate exports fell by an
astonishing 66% as European investors pulled out of Chile in order to invest their
resources into domestic reconstruction.9 As a result of this economic downturn, popular
labor mobilization gained further motivation and strength, and in 1920 a record 50,000
workers were involved in over 105 strikes.10 President Arturo Alessandri (1920-1924) and
the growing left called for constitutional reform to strip Congress of the unbalanced level
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of power it enjoyed since the 1891 civil war. On September 11, 1924,* Carlos Ibáñez
instigated a coup from the military under the leadership of General Luis Altamirano
Talavera, starting with a ruido de sables, a threatening protest that involved banging their
sabers on the walls of Congress. Without any bloodshed, Altamirano established the first
junta since the early 19th century, and immediately forced Congress to pass several of the
laws that Alessandri had proposed, including a new labor code. In the next year,
Congress approved a new constitution that empowered the executive and created bicameral legislature closer to that of the United States, officially ending the parliamentary
era.
Between 1924 and 1927, Chile saw four different heads of state, but there is no
doubt that Ibáñez controlled Chilean politics from the moment he organized the 1924
coup. He maintained his control because he held the title of minister of war, and later the
minister of the interior as well, and had the full backing of the Chilean military. He knew,
however, that the military could be easily manipulated and turned against him, especially
if proletarian mobilization continued to grow and create instability that could be used to
justify another coup. Thus, as the minister of the interior, Ibáñez outlawed communism in
March 1927 and exiled many party leaders to the island of Más Afuera.11 The following
month, he issued his most influential and lasting decree from his time in power.
With the decree No. 2,484 on April 27, 1927, Ibáñez consolidated all the various
police forces in Chile under one institution, los Carabineros de Chile. Several
motivations for the creation of the Carabineros should be closely examined. First, Ibáñez
was attempting to bring various aspects of Chile’s infrastructure and political system
under his control. He created the Carabineros in order to “strengthen the principle of

*

Ironically, the same date as the 1973 coup against Allende.
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authority…and fix the dependence of the Carabineros de Chile to the Minister of the
Interior.”12 The Department of War in Chile regularly acted as a state within the state,
able to make autonomous decisions because of the president’s minimal involvement in
the department’s affairs during times of peace. By fixing the Carabineros’ dependence on
the central civilian power, the Ministry of the Interior, instead of making it a branch of
the armed forces, Ibáñez created a way for the executive branch to fight the Department
of War and its military forces if necessary, although the Carabineros most often acted as a
deterrent to military intervention in politics rather than actually fighting them. In addition,
Ibáñez gave his new corps legal immunity through its own judiciary, allowing it to selfregulate and thus carry out the presidents’ orders without interference from other
government branches.
Thus, the creation of the Carabineros was a direct result of the unstable political
context of the 1920s, in which Ibáñez could not trust the Department of War. Such stark
division between two departments of the same government seems odd to North
Americans and others, but Chilean history has shown that these departments often fall to
the will of individuals. Professor Danny Araneda noted in his 2006 essay about the role
of the Carabineros, “It should be understood that these Carabineros were, from their
origins, destined to serve political ends and personal interests.”13 Ibáñez’s intimate
involvement in recent military uprisings was the source of his personal desire to create an
armed force that would answer directly and unconditionally to his orders. The
Carabineros’ code also stated, however, that the president could place the Carabineros
under the power of the military if he chose to do so, and their autonomous judiciary was
actually based on military code.14 Thus, despite the fact that the Carabineros corps was a
separate institution with aims at deterring the military from taking political action, it had
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ties to the military that could potentially create a feeling of allegiance between the police
and the army.
Thus, Ibáñez founded the Carabineros as an institution that would fight to
stabilize national politics and, in the context of the 1920s, the greatest threat to
destabilization was armed insurrection from the military. This meant that he had to create
a corps that was fiercely loyal to the institution of the Carabineros and the executive
government that commanded it. In whom could Ibáñez instill such controlling loyalty?
He had to appeal to those members of society who were desperate for the socioeconomic
support of a strong institution such as the Carabineros.
Thus, most of the Carabineros
came from the lowest tiers of society.
Ibáñez offered membership in this new
police force as an opportunity for the
poor to escape the slums and climb the
social ladder. For non-whites in
particular, the Carabineros offered the
opportunity to gain power in a society where they would otherwise have none. Thus,
lower-class citizens found a safety net in the Carabineros that society did not otherwise
offer them. Take, for example, the classroom pictured
above.15 This was one of the “President Ibáñez
Orphanage Schools” that offered education to
orphaned children and sought to indoctrinate them
with his ideologies. In the picture to the right, one of
these students, called “Carabineros Chicos” (little
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Carabineros), is dressed in a youth-sized Carabineros uniform.16 The children taught in
these schools were not just orphans, but working-class children who attended to these
schools at night because they had to work during the day. Ibáñez even established adult
night schools for working-class citizens.
Through these forms of education, Ibáñez taught lower-class children at an early
age to trust and idolize the Carabineros. For adults who actually joined the corps, it was
likely the first time in their lives that they had institutional support, a form of proper
education and steady income. For these reasons, they were loyal to the Carabineros
because it provided them with livelihood, not to mention a degree of social power that
was previously unattainable. One Carabinero, Francisco Zapatta, wrote in the 1944
history of the national police force, “When a citizen incorporates the [Carabineros] corps
into his life, it never leaves him willingly.”17 Zapatta continued, “The Carabinero
effectively lives bound to his institution,” and that the corps’ influence over the
individual was a “psychological occurrence.”18 Therefore, one reason that these
Carabineros did not align with Marxist ideals or even more moderate leftist ideas because,
in their personal lives, the government offered them sufficient support via the
Carabineros.
In May 1927, a month after creating the Carabineros, Ibáñez finally assumed the
presidency after winning 98% of the popular vote. His only opponent, the communist
Elías Lafertte, remained exiled with his party members during the duration of the race on
Más Afuera. Ibáñez felt safe giving up his dual title of ministers of the interior and war
because he now had the Carabineros answering directly to his office and could thus deter
a potential military uprising. Shortly after his election, Ibáñez threw two-hundred
politicians from every part of the political spectrum out of office, filled congress with his
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supporters, and began to rule by dictatorial decree.19 As the scholar Julio Faúndez noted
in his 1988 work on Chilean Marxism, the Ibáñez administration was characterized by his
“complete disregard of the democratic principles”20 established by the 1925 constitution,
which he himself helped create in order to return power to the president. Both his story as
a politician and his actions as in office demonstrate a strong authoritarian inclination that
shaped the character of his most lasting legacy, los Carabineros.
As president, Ibáñez attempted to steal the allegiance of the working class
offering them membership in his government-controlled “legal” unions under the
Republican Confederation for Civil Action (CRAC), although they never gained the
support that he had hoped for. He even went so far as to give this organization nineteen
seats in his cabinet.21 The CRAC was not as much an attempt at giving power to the
proletariat, however, as it was a method of controlling and subduing the labor movement.
He recognized their legal right to strike, yet simultaneously used the Carabineros to
violently oppress worker demonstrations.
The outbreak of the worldwide Great Depression after the U.S. stock market crash
in October 1929 greatly affected Chile’s economy, due to its connection to the
fluctuations of the foreign market. Ibáñez could not stifle the economic downturn that
followed, straining his relations with the ever-suffering working class. Wages were cut by
as much as 40% as the number of mining employees fell from 50,000 in 1929 to 8,000 in
1932.22 Faced with food shortages and economic turmoil, popular uprisings from the
working class began to occur in great numbers despite the outlawing of communism.
Students of La Universidad de Chile in Santiago, committed to Marxist ideology,
were the main provocateurs of popular uprisings against Ibáñez. The president responded
with force via his Carabineros, now using them to fight citizens instead of soldiers. This
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was the earliest moment of significance wherein the identity and function of the
Carabineros changed because political destabilization came from the citizenry, not the
military. Thus, much earlier in the Carabineros’ history, a new enemy began to emerge.
The conflict climaxed in late July 1931, when students began openly fighting the police
in the streets, leaving many dead and injured on both sides. Then a physicians’ strike at
San Vincente Hospital on July 24 followed the deaths of two protestors at the hands of
the police: a medical student, Jaime Pinto Riesco, and Professor Domingo Zañarto.23 The
strikers declared, “The physicians commit to not attend [to patients] except in the case of
emergency and not to attend to members of the Carabineros for any reason.”24 This rather
drastic manner of protest revealed a very early seed of hatred between the Carabineros
and the citizenry.
Another protest on July 25, 1931, led to the resignation of Ibáñez. Engineers,
doctors, professors, students, and public workers joined this strike of brazos caídos,
fallen arms, and paralyzed commerce and normal life until “the government collapsed
miserably in the center of the joyous protests of the entire nation.”25 The source of the
demonstrators’ joy was that this was the first instance in Chilean history that civilian
activism had resulted in direct political change. Furthermore, the wide range of
professions that participated in these protests shows that objection to the government did
not just come from the lowest ranks of society, but was present in many tiers of society.
This was not a Marxist revolution, but a protest against the Ibáñez regime from a diverse
range of citizens.
Where were the Carabineros when the government collapsed? One of the
president’s secretaries recalled, “…the Carabineros were absolutely at the side of Ibáñez.
At the end, the Carabineros, desperate and unassimilated to the popular movement, were
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waiting for orders from Ibáñez. But this was very delusional.”26 Clearly the police, despite
their often working-class origins, were more loyal to their institution than to popular
sentiment. It was this institutional loyalty that prevented them from assimilating to the
“popular movement.” At least in 1931, it appeared that the Carabinero, Zapatta, was
correct in writing that “the Carabinero effectively lives bound to his institution.” The
Carabineros were not loyal because someone told them to be, they were loyal because
they felt a personal connection to their institution.
Despite the Carabineros’ unfaltering loyalty, President Ibáñez knew in July 1931
that he had lost the support of the people and chose to resign. The president’s resignation
left a hole in the government that led to yet another power struggle. Between July 26,
1931 and December 1932, eight different people took the helm of the Chilean
government. The most notable of these was Arturo Puga Osorio, who established the first
socialist republic of the Americas with the aid of Marmaduke Grove, a conspirator in the
1924 coup. Puga’s government attempted to nationalize copper mining and passed a few
small pieces of legislation, but failed to last more than 13 days.27
Meanwhile, in the context of the power struggle that followed the fall of President
Ibáñez, Congress faced an important and controversial question: what should be done
with the Carabineros, a powerful and well-equipped force that was fiercely loyal to their
creator, Ibáñez, and also ferociously hated by much of the citizenry for their reputation of
brutal oppression? Immediately following the events of July 1931, the politicians set out
to answer this question. Congressional Delegate Juan Pradenas Muñoz led the charge
against the Carabineros, proposing that they be reorganized in order to detach them from
the Ministry of the Interior, and thus the president, to eliminate their capacity for
intrusion into the social and political spheres. Instead, Pradenas wanted an autonomous
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branch of the government, separate from any congressional or executive body, to control
them. Furthermore, he sought to eliminate the legal immunity they had secured through a
legal code based on that of the military so that they would be subject to civil law.28
In response to these attacks from Congress, the officers of the Carabineros
reiterated their steadfast loyalty to the ruling government. Carlos Robles Sotomayor, then
Prefect Commander of the Carabineros of Santiago, issued a statement about the July
1931 domestic conflicts on behalf of the officer corps in which he declared,
In the case of this situation, the officials of the Carabineros consider it
essential to put on record…the Carabineros had no other mission nor other
duty than the strict compliance with received orders from superiors [the
president via the Ministry of the Interior being the most superior]….29
Commander Sotomayor did two important things here. First, he attempted to exonerate
the Carabineros for the crimes against the public during the 1931 uprisings by making it
clear that they were simply following orders. Second, he reinforced the subservient
character of the Carabineros by suggesting that they unquestioningly obeyed the orders of
their immediate superiors within the corps, the officers, and their greater superior, the
executive branch of the government. He went on in his statement to expand upon this
second point:
Because of their tradition, los Carabineros de Chile have been, and forever will
be…an especially obedient service of the government and of the republic,
whichever it may be (my emphasis)…[the Carabineros] therefore never
deliberate, nor alter, nor distort the commands that inform them via their chain of
command.30
Sotomayor’s statement once again reinforced the value the Carabineros placed on
obedience and emphasized that this was an important part of their tradition, and thus their
identity. He extrapolated from this point that this police force would obey the commands
of whatever administration was in power because they did not break the chain of
command, the top of which was the civil executive. In the end, the purported loyalty of
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swayed the majority of the delegates in their favor. Congress rejected Juan Pradenas’
propositions to eliminate the Carabineros’ immunity and extinguish their political
influence as a tool of the Ministry of the Interior in a vote of 55 to 13.31
By popular vote, Arturo Alessandri returned to the presidency in December 1932*
and, between 1932 and 1937 he remained acutely aware of the threat of military
intervention that had plagued previous presidencies. He ousted a number of high-ranking
military officials and simultaneously supported Republican Militias, which right-wing
extremists founded in 1932 to defend the government against potential military uprisings
and the perceived threat of the leftist labor movements. These militias consistently
maintained over 10,000 combatants (one source estimates that their numbers reached
20,000 in May 1933)32 as well as advanced weaponry, heavy artillery and even tanks.33
Alessandri encouraged them, which many considered illegal since he supported an extraconstitutional force that was doing the job of the Carabineros. Although it was an
inefficient use of resources, the decision to depend on this loyal militia instead of the
national police was logical, since the Carabineros’ original allegiance to Ibáñez could not
be overlooked. Despite Alessandri’s lack of trust, for the time being the Carabineros
faced no other serious attempts to diminish their power. The animosity of the citizenry
toward the Carabineros, however, persisted.
Public attitudes toward the Carabineros, in general, had never been positive,
especially among lower- and middle-class citizens who most frequently came into
conflict with them. This hostility likely existed toward the various police forces even
before Ibáñez consolidated them into the Carabineros. By creating one national police
force, however, Ibáñez also consolidated the anti-authoritarian sentiments of the
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population against this singular entity. Indeed, on the day that Ibáñez resigned, citizens
took advantage of the situation by hunting the Carabineros and even executing some of
them in the street. Arturo Olavarría, a Santiago citizen who was present during these days,
recalls in his memoirs:
In the streets of the capital a hunt began for the Carabineros, many of whom
were cowardly murdered by the mob that stupidly punished them for acts
that were the responsibility of the fallen government.34
This account reveals the militant attitude that much of the citizenry had toward the
national police in the 1930s, understandable emotions from the downtrodden that were
subjugated by the brutality of these officers and the oppression of the government they
served. Olavarría, however, seems have understood clearly who was truly responsible for
the oppression, namely the Ibáñez administration, rather than individual Carabineros who
were truly subject to the orders of their superiors. Thus, even though the Carabineros
were not entirely to blame, and some Chileans recognized this, they became the target of
popular anger toward the government, which often took the form of physical violence.
Moreover, this animosity toward the Carabineros was sure to affect the evolving
identity of the individual officers and the institution. Congress allowed the national police
force to retain its strength after Ibáñez’s departure, but the role that this very new police
force would play in the future of Chile was entirely uncertain. Thus, 1932 was a
watershed year for Chile as a whole and the Carabineros’ future because Alessandri’s
election marked a return to relatively stable politics after a decade that saw more than ten
governments rise and fall. Furthermore, communism was once again legal after 1932,
meaning that the door was open for Marxism to move into the forefront of Chilean
politics. Since this ideology posed a threat to the capitalist elite that controlled politics,
would the Carabineros also view it as a threat? The Carabineros had a well-defined role
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while Ibáñez ruled as a dictator – to maintain order by keeping the military at bay – but
where was their place after a return to stable democracy?

28

III. The Carabineros’ Identity Crisis and Marxist Growth
After Arturo Alessandri’s 1932 election, Chile saw a return to relatively stable
and democratic politics following the tumultuous decade that preceded it. The most
significant change was that the military, in general, ceased to interfere in the political
sphere. For the Carabineros, this created somewhat of an identity crisis because the threat
of military intervention was no longer in the foreground. Being only five years old, the
identity of the Carabineros’ institution remained very malleable as they searched for other
threats to the Chile’s internal order. Throughout the 1930s and into the 1940s, political
activism became such a threat, but whether or not the Carabineros would identify a
specific group as their primary enemy was not yet determined. Rather, their role was
merely to follow the orders of the executive.
While it is not fair to argue at this point that the Carabineros identified the growth
of Marxism as the greatest threat to Chile’s political stability, President Alessandri and
the majority of Congress, controlled by the right, most certainly viewed it as such. The
president’s focus on growing Chile’s export economy while failing to appease the
workers’ demands for higher wages and better working conditions exacerbated the
situation, leading to frequent protests. Alessandri responded by using the Carabineros to
quell strikes and uprisings, and sometimes even declared emergency powers in unruly
mining regions so that he could use the military as well. In June and July 1934, for
instance, in the southern region of Cautín, he ordered the Carabineros and the military to
suppress a violent protest of evicted peasants in the so-called Ranquil Rebellion; they
shot and killed over one hundred protestors.1 The fact that the president used the military
along with the Carabineros contradicted the original purpose of the national police and
marked a very early transition in their relationship with the rest of the Chilean armed
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forces. This development was likely an early seed of trust that had the potential to
develop over the next several decades into a stronger professional relationship.
In the years that followed, despite the efforts of Alessandri and the political right
to prevent it, the Chilean Marxist movement grew rapidly and became more unified.
Recall that the early roots of this movement lay in the labor federations, the FOCH and
the IWW, as well as the POS that became the Communist Party. While the popularity of
Marxism suffered briefly while Ibáñez was in power because he outlawed the
communists, the ideology made a quick recovery and several political parties began to
gain a following. In April 1933, several small left-wing groups combined to form the
partido socialista (PS) under the leadership of Marmaduke Grove and won the allegiance
of over four hundred of the “legal” CRAC unions that Ibánez had created.* At the same
time, the partido comunista (PC) struggled to recover since it had lost much of its union
membership under FOCH – the labor federation founded in 1909 – to Ibáñez’s CRAC
unions.2 Furthermore, the PC refused to work with these “legal” unions because they
viewed them as un-free since they the government regulated them. Meanwhile, the PS
worked within the established system, subverting the CRAC unions from within and, by
the end of the Alessandri administration, the PS would grow to be the fourth largest party,
three times the size of the PC.3 While the left was divided over strategy with regard to
working with the government or against it, they were gaining strength and posing a
greater threat each day to the elites of the Liberal and Conservative parties that still
controlled Congress and the executive.
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The right’s perception of the left as a threat deepened the polarization between
Chile’s political parties, especially after April 1934 when the centrist Radical party
withdrew from Alessandri’s cabinet, hoping to become a senior partner in an alliance
with the far-left.4 (Again, Appendix 4 shows a breakdown of Chile’s major political
parties.) This was an important turning point because it created an even sharper divide
between the Liberal-Conservative bloc and the growing left. Even with the Radicals,
however, the left still could not win a majority in Congress and thus continued to
encourage workers within their unions to strike.
Alessandri’s economic polices did push Chile’s economy forward successfully.
By 1937, industrial and agricultural production passed pre-depression levels and
domestic factory output reached production levels such that it satisfied 97% of consumer
needs.5 Still, the standard of living for lower-class Chileans remained extremely poor,
primarily due to low wages, and the number of laborers on strikes rose from three
thousand to eighteen thousand between 1930 and 1937.6 The PS and PC were most
responsible for inciting these strikes, reinforcing the right’s perception of all worker
mobilization as Marxist, and the reactionary forces of Alessandri’s government
responded with violence.
In February 1936, Alessandri declared a state of emergency and dissolved
Congress in response to a nation-wide railway workers’ strike. The president closed
down opposition papers* and imprisoned leaders of the labor movement and the leftist
parties.7 Alessandri even created a new special forcers unit within the Carabineros
designed to fight protestors in August 1936 that would later come to be known as the
*

This happened frequently during times of particular contention, especially when the government
was conducting some of its most brutal oppression. This made my research of primary sources
difficult at times because when trying to find first hand accounts of certain oppressive events, left
wing newspapers were not publishing and other newspapers were not talking about them.
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Grupo Móvil.8 Marmaduke Grove, founder of the PS, wrote in November 1936 of
Alessandri that, “he really had lost his popularity, committed to the right, with his politics
of hate and prosecution, he became more distanced each day from the working classes.”9
The Carabineros, following Alessandri’s orders, most certainly followed suit as they too
became more distanced from the working classes they so often originated from.
The oppression of the working class did not, however, discourage the left. Indeed,
the Latin American scholar Julio Faúndez wrote in a 1988 work on Chilean Marxism that
Alessandri’s oppressive forces were not strong enough to destroy the labor movement,
but they were strong enough to unite it.10 The result of this uniting force occurred in June
1936 with the official creation of the Frente Popular, The Popular Front, an electoral
coalition that included the PS, PC, Radicals and Democrats. None of these parties stood a
chance against the Liberal-Conservative coalition that together held 34.5% of the voting
power in Congress. The Radicals constituted 18.4%, and the Democrats 13.4%,11 but by
combining with the much smaller left parties they could gain a true majority, thus
fulfilling the Radicals’ goal of being a dominant force within a strong coalition, the
reason they left Alessandri’s cabinet in 1934. For the struggling PC, this opportunity
came about at the perfect moment as they strictly followed the policy of the Comintern in
Moscow, recently redesigned to encourage alliances with all left wing parties in an effort
to fight Nazism.12 In line with this policy, the PC combined all of its unions with the PS
unions under the Confederación de Trabajadores de Chile (CTCH) in December 1936.13
(It is noteworthy that the Popular Front coalition was purely electoral, not ideological.
See Appendix 5 for a more details about this.) These developments in the Chilean party
system are relevant because they increased political polarization, intensifying hostility
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between the left and right. In ordering the Carabineros to oppress the working class, the
right transmitted this hostility to the national police.
Thus far, it seems that the Carabineros only fought workers’ movements,
perceived as exclusively Marxist ones, during the 1930s. But another form of extraparliamentary mobilization occurred during this period as well, this time from the right.
Chile’s National Socialist Movement, founded in April 1932 by the German descendent
Jorge González von Marées, declared itself Chile’s nacista movement, a local reflection
of Adolf Hitler’s growing National Socialist Workers Party in Germany.14 The
Carabineros viewed the nacistas as a threat to internal order as well, and often fought
them in street when they staged demonstrations or fought the leftist workers. This goes to
show that the Carabineros, at this point, were not just an instrument for oppressing the
left, although they targeted the workers most frequently. Due to the widespread
militarism of activists such as the nacistas, socialists and communists, Alessandri sought
to legalize the use of oppressive force against them.
In late 1936, Congress began the process of passing a bill called the Ley de
Seguirdad Interior del Estado, the State Internal Security Law. The proposed bill would
ban the use of political uniforms by civilians and use the force of the Carabineros to place
heavy restrictions on meetings and publications. The fact that the law did not target the
left specifically, but all political activists, speaks to the government’s opposition to all
causes of disorder. In December 1936, La Estrella reflected widespread opinion about the
law:
As a free and independent press, we have developed the opinion that, behind the
guise of defining the provisions for repressing enemies of internal security, they
have made an attack on civil liberties and an evident attempt at intervening in the
coming March elections.15
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This excerpt both exemplified public opinion about the law, and highlighted one of its
most unpopular features. In March 1938, the next congressional election was set to take
place and the right was surely searching for a way to fight against the Popular Front’s
growing power. Many on the left saw the Ley de Seguridad as an unconstitutional attempt
to justify that. This opinion held merit, as the election had the potential to produce a large
swing in power toward the left since the Popular Front could gain a majority in Congress.
In late January 1937, two months before the congressional election and mere
weeks before the final vote on Alessandri’s security law, groups of protestors took to the
streets in Santiago against the new legislation. La Estrella reported that “the only thing
they threw were shouts such as ‘We want a free Chile,’ ‘Down with the gag law,’ and
‘Long live liberty.’”16 Yet the Carabineros, or the “reactionary forces of the right” as
Marmaduke would have described them, responded with violence:
Carabineros, on orders from the upper authorities [Ministry of Interior],
proceeded to dissolve the demonstration and oppress various citizens…In an
interview with the Santiago Mayor, he said that the demonstration was
authorized. Here we understand justice and equality before the law as seen
by the right. If the intervention begins here, what will we have to face in
March?17
That the mayor had authorized the demonstration and the demonstrators acted peacefully
made the repressive acts by the Carabineros overtly unconstitutional. True, the potential
bias of La Estrella – the leaders of the labor movement organized it – should be noted,
but both Alessandri’s and the Carabineros’ tendencies toward violence reinforce the story.
In February, Congress passed the Ley de Seguridad, allowing the use of
oppression in various forms against political activists. One of the most famous usages of
the law occurred in January 1938, when President Alessandri used it to justify the
Carabineros’ seizure of all copies of an issue of the world-renowned satirical magazine
Topaze,18 which contained a political cartoon that humiliated Alessandri in its illustration
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of his subservient relationship with Ibáñez during the 1920s (See Appendix 6). Although
the courts immediately exonerated the editor and returned the copies to the publisher, the
Carabineros later staged a nighttime raid on the magazine, burning all of the copies that
remained. Alessandri later admitted that he directly ordered the raid.19 What is clear is
that the president had pushed the Carabineros from their role as a civilian police, charged
with the task of maintaining order, into the role of a political tool, demonstrating the
executive’s control over this institution and their potential for political influence.
Despite the new security law, the Popular Front remained united and prepared for
the October 1938 presidential elections, continuing to encourage labor mobilization. The
newspaper ¡Alerta!, organized by the Democratic Party on behalf of the Popular Front,
published an article during the presidential campaign calling the workers to unite under
the coalition:
The worker is ready; his conscience is clear; he is not the meek lamb of
yesterday; he knows what his obligation is…WORKERS: the advances of the
right affront the popular trenches, in the coming elections, they will be strongly
defended by the FRENTE POPULAR!20
This militant appeal set the stage for a crucial election, one that had the potential to install
a Marxist president, or at least one very sympathetic to the left. Marmaduke Grove wrote,
“The next presidential campaign is designed…as a contentious fight between the popular
forces of the left and the reactionary forces of the right.”21 As the election grew closer
these “popular forces” and the “reactionary forces” indeed came into contention.
The 1938 presidential election had three primary candidates: Pedro Aguirre Cerda,
a Radical, ran under the Popular Front, Gustavo Ross ran for the Liberal-Conservative
coalition, and Ibáñez returned under the flag of the new Popular Freedom Alliance with
the support of the nacistas and other fringe parties. The election took place in typical
Chilean fashion, amid violent confrontation and significant disruption of the democratic
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process. On one occasion, during the president’s final message to Congress in June, the
Conservatives and Liberals shouted down a senator of the Radical Party who attempted to
interrupt the speech. In defense of their new political ally, the Popular Front members
began to walk out when one of the three nacista congressmen and the party founder,
González von Marées, fired his pistol into the roof of Congress. The Carabineros
removed him and the other nacista senator from the hall.22
Three months later, on September 4, several thousand ibañistas and nacistas
began demonstrations in the street. The next day, two groups of nacistas seized the
University of Chile and the Seguro Obligaorio, a government building near the Moneda.
In the process of taking over the Seguro Obligaorio, the occupiers killed a Carabinero.
The national police swiftly recaptured both buildings by force, killing six in the process.
The two groups of young men who survived, totaling sixty-one, were then shot dead by
the Carabineros. (The picture to the left
shows the Carabineros escorting their
captives.)23 Some believe that the killings
were the result of a direct order from
Alessandri, although there is little
evidence to prove this.24 The lone
survivor of the Carabineros’ assault on the seventh floor of the Seguro Obligaorio, Carlos
Pizarro Cárdenas, recounted the experience some sixty years later:
We scrambled down. On the sixth floor there was an employee of the Seguro
that said, “this is an employee, this one is not....” There was a man who
claimed to be an employee. He repeated that his name was Cabello. An oficial
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head butted him and a civil* shot him in the stomach….Afterward, another oficial
asked me who I was and I said that I was not an employee. The civil
turned and said, “You are the same as the rest,” and shot me in the stomach.25
This massacre demonstrated the excessive and indiscriminate force that characterized the
Carabineros. Cabello was in fact an employee in the building, an innocent bystander
rather than a nacista occupier. The manner in which the Carabineros officers addressed
the people in this story reveals their sense of authority and a superiority complex that
surely influenced the way they acted toward the general population. They exhibited no
sympathies for these citizens, but rather self-righteous indignation. Furthermore, the
massacre of the sixty-one occupiers after their surrender revealed how much the
Carabineros had become a violent tool to suppress extremist groups, the nacistas in this
case. Whether or not the order to execute the protestors came from the executive or
within the Carabineros’ hierarchy, the act was a political statement: the government was
prepared to use any degree of force against those who attempted to upset the
constitutional order in Chile by extra-legal means, a force previously identified as the
military. Now, the Carabineros viewed militant civilians who caused domestic
disturbances as the greatest threat to Chile’s constitutional order, but not necessarily
activists from the left specifically.
As a result of these events, Ibáñez withdrew his name from the ballot and put his
support behind Aguirre, giving him the votes needed to win the election 50.2% to
49.3%.26 Thus, Marxists’ first success in a presidential election came as something of a
mishap due to the armed insurrection of the opposing forces and the rash actions taken by
the Carabineros. At the same time, since Aguirre most closely aligned with the Radicals
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he was not the revolutionary that the PC had hoped for, nor was he the constitutional
Marxist that the PS had hoped would give power to the workers. While the labor
movement would make strides during this administration, this Popular Front victory was
not as grand as it seemed on the surface, especially with Congress in the hands of the
Liberal-Conservative bloc.
Despite the fact that the newly elected President Aguirre was a Radical, and thus
much more central leaning than a true ally of the left, the Marxists of the Popular Front
put much hope in him. They considered the new president their first legitimate
opportunity to effect significant change in the living conditions of the rural peasantry and
the urban workers. Furthermore, many on the far left of the Popular Front rather naively
believed that Aguirre’s election gave them a foot in the door to establish Chilean
Marxism. The socialist newspaper, Acción, directly expressed this sentiment in the
months following the election:
The dictatorship, with the Popular Front in the government, will not be the
dictatorship of the president elected in October, nor the dictatorship of the
Radical Party. It will be – without a single doubt – the Marxist dictatorship,
the absolute control of the Socialist Party. The president cannot fail to
understand this!27
President Aguirre’s policies aimed at the betterment of the Chilean lower class, but he
had no intention of creating the “Marxist dictatorship” that the socialists hoped his
presidency would be. Quite the contrary, Aguirre found himself rather powerless in front
of a Congress that remained controlled by the Liberal-Conservative bloc. The right not
only opposed his reformist politics, but also loathed the president on a personal level
because he lacked an upper-class background and because he was a mestizo, a Latin-
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American with Spanish and native heritage.* It is said that some rightist congressmen
even refused to shake his hand.28 This animosity and the right’s control over Congress
made it incredibly difficult for the Popular Front to bring any legislative change, although
Aguirre did have some success creating a state-controlled development agency called
COFO, which allowed him to obtain some control over Chilean industry. (See Appendix
7 for more details on this and Aguirre’s other reform policies.)
Some in Chile met the rise of the Popular Front with more direct action than
merely blocking legislation in Congress. In August 1939, General Ariosto Herrera and
Ibáñez made a feeble attempt at overthrowing the government, a coup attempt referred to
as the Ariostazo. Their plan was to seize control of the Tacna regiment, a military
regiment based in Santiago similar to our National Guard, and use their artillery and
manpower to overtake the government. The plot failed to gain adequate support, however,
and the other officers in the military quickly suppressed it before a legitimate threat could
materialize. The divide in loyalty of pro-coup officers and others who remained firmly
allied to the constitutional government ran deep within the military. The fact that the
military officers loyal to the government prevailed likely reinforced the Carabineros’
trust in the military as a whole, despite the fact that coup conspirators such as General
Herrera and Ibáñez still existed.
Congress took the opportunity of the Ariostazo to make a point by granting
President Aguirre emergency powers to deal with this threat, but declaring that they
would not be as likely to do so in the future if his left-leaning political views did not
change. The Conservative Party’s newspaper, Diario Ilustrado, later condemned the
*

During the colonial period, one’s race largely dictated their social status in much of the SpanishAmericas. In this system, called the Casta system, different combinations fell into varying levels in
the social hierarchy. Examples include criollos (100% white but born in the Americas), mestizos (one
white parent, one native), and mulatos (one white parent, one African). The stigmatisms associated
with the classifications often carry over into modern society.
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attempted coup while also suggesting that it was a reasonable response to Aguirre’s
policies.29 The right wing, in other words, was willing to work with Aguirre’s
administration, but would stand firm against his left-leaning policies such as agricultural
reform plans and proposed increases in taxation. This event marked a very early turning
point in the Popular Front government, after which the centrist president would be
steadily forced toward the right.
One of the most significant results of Aguirre’s move toward the right after
August 1939 was his failure to follow through on promised agricultural reform. Reform
in the countryside was an important issue during the 1930s. In 1939, less than 1% of
landowners possessed approximately 68% of the nation’s agricultural land in haciendas,
massive estates owned by the so-called latifundistas discussed in chapter two.30 In 1939,
Marmaduke Grove, founder of the PS, estimated that 340,000 Chilean rural workers
received barely enough food to live and lived in shacks that “do not appear to have been
constructed for human beings.”31 With growing Marxist influence, these peasants became
increasingly politically active in the 1930s, represented by the formation of nearly 200
new rural unions during the early years of the Popular Front government.32 After the
latinfundista-controlled National Society of Agriculture put significant pressure on
Aguirre, however, the president used a combination of legislation and Carabineros force
to ban further unionization. Thus, agricultural reform fell out of political relevance for the
time being as the abused peasants continued to suffer in the countryside.
The quelling of popular mobilization in the countryside was not, however, an
indicator of the overall trend of the labor movement during the Popular Front government.
Widespread strikes and protests continued and, in September 1939, the newspaper
¡Adelante! reported that 16% of the Chilean population was involved in a union, a
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percentage second only to the Soviet Union.33 Clearly, the Marxist parties, the PS and PC,
were gaining considerable ground during the late 1930s as they encouraged the
unionization that they controlled. It is important to note, however, that the ideologies of
the PC and the PS were no closer to reconciliation despite their Popular Front alliance.
For their part, the socialists still hinged their policy on bringing about a Marxist
revolution through the electorate. The editors of Acción pushed this point in a 1939
article titled, “Against Violence:”
The political action of most, of the grand majority, is inclined toward violence.
See that this is an obstacle to your wishes…The path of choosing to meet violence
with violence is absurd and extremely unintelligent. We would have to be the
strongest, the most bloodthirsty, and still the triumph would be costly and shortlived.34
The socialists recognized that the majority of “political action…is inclined toward
violence,” meaning that although the socialists promoted a Marxist revolution though
popular election, violent means often resulted from strikes. They also argued that
“meeting violence with violence” would not work, which implied that the government
still used violence to suppress popular movements. It then recognized that the labor
movement was not sufficient in strength to stand up against the government forces, and a
battle with them would be “costly and short-lived” even if triumphant. Thus, it is
apparent that violence was very much a part of the labor movement’s daily struggle, but
the PS remained true to its policy of non-violent reform.
The Communist Party, on the other hand, encouraged the organization of militias
and general anti-authority sentiments. In October 1940, the secretary general of the PC,
Carlos Contreras Labarca, “denounced the rightist conspiracy against the common folk,”
and “expressed that it was necessary that the people maintain their vigilance in the
streets…and organize communist militias.”35 A couple months later the communist
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newspaper, El Luchador Obrero, published an article about the relationship between
communism and authority that read, “Communism is the enemy, by its essence, of
legitimate authority.”36 The party leaders’ encouragement to form militias and the
promotion of anti-authority ideology show that, despite the Popular Front coalition, the
PC had not abandoned its policy of armed revolution by any means.
Meanwhile, the government’s response to popular mobilization, especially that
which took a violent form as promoted by the PC, was to use the Carabineros as an
oppressive force. In August 1940, the minister of the interior sent an official notice to the
director general of the Carabineros in which he ordered, “with regard to the agitation in
the countryside and the industrial centers,” that “the labor of the carabineros should be
used in this case, by means of the strict vigilance of these agitated workers that create
artificial problems….”37 The focus on the workers here as the agitators marks a shift from
the use of the Carabineros to quell general disturbances during the Alessandri
administration to specifically targeting the working class during the Aguirre
administration. The order to use “strict vigilance” appeared rather mild, but was probably
euphemistic in its wording. In any case, the order certainly showed that the Ministry of
the Interior was focused on using the Carabineros as a force to specifically target
proletariat and the peasantry and that it did not view their grievances as legitimate, but
rather as “artificial.” Orders such as these, based in the belief that these grievances were
“artificial,” surely alienated the Carabineros further from their lower-class origins.
Regardless of the mild language of the Ministry of the Interior’s August 1940
order, there is evidence that the Carabineros used a liberal interpretation of “strict
vigilance.” In October 1941, for example, a group of anti-Nazi protestors from the
working class took to the street, a common occurrence during World War II that the
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presence of Nazi sympathizers within Chile only exacerbated. According the report of
Nuevo Andamio, a newspaper published on behalf of a plasterers’ union, the protestors
were peacefully singing the national anthem. When the Carabineros arrived,
“The superior officer ordered that they dissolve the protest with the force of the garrote,*
as in the times of Ibáñez and Alessandri…seriously wounding comrade Sagredo who
went to the hospital.”38 It is possible that this newspaper, given its bias toward the plight
of the proletariat, underemphasized the unrest of the protestors or failed to mention some
provocation on their part that agitated the Carabineros. Even so, the incident exemplified
the sort of violent conflict that occurred between the Carabineros and the workers despite
Aguirre’s leftist sympathies.
The aftermath of the 1920s and Chile’s return to fairly stable and democratic
politics saw several developments in the evolution of the Carabineros. Being a very
young institution, the Carabineros sought to define their identity after the fall of Ibáñez in
1931. The stabilization of politics and the military’s overall loyalty to the government
made the Carabineros’ future unclear since their initial role was to defend against a
disloyal military in the midst of unstable politics. The Ariostazo may seem to have
indicated that the military was not fully loyal to the government, but since the coup failed
because Ariosto and Ibáñez could not rally support, this futile attempt actually proved the
contrary.
As the Carabineros sought a new threat to defend against, their main enemy
became the agitators who created internal disorder. These agitators came from both the
left, in the form of labor mobilization, and the right, the nacistas that attempted to disrupt
*

Literally translates to stick, but refers to the baton that the Carabineros carry. Chilean newspapers
with leftist sympathies often refer to the suffering of the Chilean people under the garrote, and thus
the word became widely recognized as synonymous with oppression and authoritarianism. I do not
translate it to baton because of this sentiment and its frequent use.
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the 1938 election, for example. For Alessandri, most of Congress, and eventually Aguirre,
however, there was a much more specific threat: the growth of Chilean Marxism. They
used the Carabineros to fight this threat and, in response to this oppression, the Marxists
encouraged retaliation, the formation of militias, and further mobilization. With each civil
disturbance, the Carabineros’ identity as a symbol of state oppression became more
deeply entrenched as their role became less focused on the protection of the government
against the military and more focused on the protection of capitalism against leftist
workers’ movements. Still, the Carabineros did not have an institutionalized
predisposition against Marxism or the working class at this point, but frequently clashed
with them because the executives ordered the national police to target labor movements.
As this trend of targeting the working class continued during the next several decades,
however, it certainly affected the identity and the biases of the both individual
Carabineros and the institution as a whole.
IV. Growing Anti-Marxism Reflected in the Carabineros
The popularization of Marxist ideology increased with regard to mobilizing
workers or electoral strength during the 1940s, despite the right’s attempt to prevent this.
The right still did, however, maintain convincing control over national politics because of
its majority in Congress. Furthermore, the outbreak of the Cold War during the late 1940s
put significant pressure on Chile to subdue the growth of Marxism because the United
States was a major stakeholder in Chilean copper. If the Chilean government adopted
Marxist ideology, or even a very far left one, they would likely nationalize copper mines
and U.S. companies would suffer substantial monetary losses. These internal and external
pressures led to widespread anti-Marxist sentiments, often reflected in the Carabineros as
the executive ordered them to repress labor mobilization even more aggressively. Thus
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far, however, no evidence has shown that these Carabineros held distinctly personal
biases against the Marxists, only that they followed orders. True, the manner in which
they carried out these orders had been very abusive thus far, but the Carabineros equally
abused the nacistas and Marxists alike.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that the Carabineros had developed
prejudices against the workers, since these police specifically targeted them more
frequently. This is an even more reasonable assumption since many workers, especially
those associated with the PC, held very militant attitudes toward the national police. This,
of course, had the potential to foster hostility toward the working class within the
Carabineros. Still, these assumptions have little empirical support at this point in the
Carabineros’ story. A 1941 plasterers’ strike in Santiago, as told by the newspaper Nuevo
Andamio, gave a good representation of the developing relationship between the
mobilizing proletariat and the Carabineros during the early 1940s.
The plasterers in Santiago went on strike in December 1941, and from the earliest
days of the strike these workers came into conflict with the Carabineros. Nuevo Andamio
reported extensively on the abuses that these workers faced from the Carabineros, and
while the bias and possible exaggerations of this paper must be considered, it
nevertheless sheds light on the brutal and abusive actions of the national police force. The
newspaper published the following article, “Ibáñez’s Drunks Put Into Action,” just a
couple of weeks into the strike:
The series of abuses and inhumane treatments that these celebrities* [the
Carabineros] commit…we have repeatedly denounced them…Incalculable
are the victims that have fallen under the garrote of these lackeys. But these
irresponsible ones have orders to proceed; orders from their superiors; I call
*

The word used here was actually “los famosos,” which literally means “the famous ones,” but there
is no good English translation that carries the same prose so I chose to use “celebrities” in my
translation.
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them irresponsible because ninety percent are illiterates, drunks, the
uneducated, poor, etc…1
Speaking of a general trend of abuse by these government agents, rather than a specific
incident, Nuevo Andamio expressed the striking workers’ feeling that they were
unjustifiably oppressed. The second part of the excerpt implied that the Carabineros were
merely puppets, following the orders of their superiors, but also belittled them as
“illiterates, drunks, uneducated, poor, etc…” More than belittling them, however, this
statement identified the Carabineros as lower-class citizens and as having the same traits
as those workers they fought, primarily poverty and a lack of formal education.
It does not appear, however, that this shared background yielded any sympathies
from the Carabineros toward the Chilean lower class when they protested for a better life.
The same article in Nuevo Andamio went on to say that, while the Carabineros
“barbarically” abused the poor, they showed the “privileged classes…respect and
softness.”2 Granted, these “privileged classes” very rarely staged protests in the street
when compared with the lower class, and were thus less likely to come into conflict with
the Carabineros and develop a hostile relationship. Still, the working class clearly
recognized a discontinuity in how the police treated different citizens based on their
social class. At the same time, Nuevo Andamio gave the Carabineros something of a free
pass by stating that they simply followed orders. Perhaps the author excused the
Carabineros’ abuses as the following of orders here as an attempt to rationalize their
betrayal of their own class. The final statement, that the Carabineros were “irresponsible
because ninety percent are illiterates, drunks, the uneducated, poor, etc…” seems to
imply that the Carabineros could have been a force for good if educated about the plight
of the workers. Instead, these police remained cut off from leftist ideals, their only
education came from the institution they served.
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In mid-March, about sixty days into the plasterers’ strike, Nuevo Andamio
displayed an even less favorable attitude about the Carabineros than it had showed in the
early days of the strike: “The powers that the Carabineros have exercised during this
strike have passed their limits…it is clear that the police are acting on their own without
authority.”3 This statement marked a clear departure from the previous view that the
Carabineros acted abusively on superior orders, but it was not clear where in the chain of
command authority ceased to control the Carabineros’ actions. That is, were individual
Carabineros “acting on their own without authority,” or were high-ranking officers giving
orders to abuse the workers that did not come from higher up in the chain of command?
This distinction is important because if the individual officers were acting abusively
without being ordered to do so, it would imply that they felt personally justified in the
oppression of the working class by violent means. This would mean that their abuses
represented personal anti-worker sentiments that extended beyond loyalty to their
institution and the orders they received, a significant development in the identity of the
Carabineros.
About ten days later, Nuevo Andamio published a story that sheds light on the
motivations of the individual Carabineros. According to the story, one of the protesters,
Angel Morande, was walking through
Huemul, a Santiago neighborhood that
was at the center of the plasterers’
strike. When a sub-contractor who
opposed the strike, Enrique Viyetes,
and “his woman” saw that Morande
was alone, they called on two
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Carabineros to come and detain him. As depicted in the illustration of this incident4 that
accompanied the article, the Carabineros then held Morande while Viyetes and “his
woman” beat him. Morande had to be hospitalized for several days following the
beating.5 Upon close inspection of Viyetes’ vest, one can make out two swastikas,
revealing his alleged association with the nacistas. Furthermore, Vieyetes is wearing suit
with a tie, while Morande appears to be in the clothes of a worker, indicating a class
distinction between the two characters. This is a particularly striking development,
because not only did the Carabineros target the leftist worker in this story, but they aided
the nacistas, taking a side in both the political and the class struggle. The Carabineros did
not act as a neutral force, simply maintaining order, but chose to side with the
representatives of a specific ideology.
This story indicates that, during this strike, at least some of the Carabineros were
not only biased against the protesters, but were willing to actively instigate or partake in
criminal abuse against them. A clear progression occurred as the plasterers’ strike
continued. While the protesters initially viewed the Carabineros as puppets carrying out
the orders of their superiors, after several months of protesting they came to view the
police as carrying out abuses of their own accord. The Carabineros’ assistance in the
beating of Angel Morande implied that this was in fact the case. It appeared that with
each passing day of conflict the Carabineros had become increasingly hostile on a more
personal level toward the protesters, fully ignoring their similarities in class background.
Clearly, the way that the Carabineros identified their role in this particular strike evolved
from an objective mediator to an active participant in the ideological battle.
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At about the same time that the plasters’ strike occurred in the early 1940s,* a
Carabineros Lieutenant, Don Amadeo Pinto Arellano, wrote an essay about how to
improve relations between the Carabineros and the public that sheds light on their
growing, mutual hostility. In the opening paragraphs of his essay, Pinto described his
opinion on how the Carabineros viewed the working class:
We have the fact that, considering ourselves a country of democratic structure,
our acts prove that we are enemies of this form of government. Further, we accept
the existence of castes…Poverty is considered a crime; we can’t conceive the
existence of a gentleman in the clothes of a worker; we disrespect our domestic
employees as an inferior race, and we use the derogatory pronoun, tú,† with those
who earn their bread honorably, those who operate our machines, build our
houses and serve us food….We close the doors of mutual understanding and we
stigmatize them like a parasite….This lack of culture, these colonial vices, they
have seeped into us, dominated our sentiments…6
According to Pinto, the Carabineros’ actions showed that they were “enemies” of a
democratic government. Pinto did not write that the institution was fundamentally antidemocratic, but rather that their recent acts had made them so. That is, Pinto did not
believe that the Carabineros had an institutionalized anti-democratic nature. In fact, later
in the same article, he wrote that, “…everyone in our country knows…[our] authority is
of a clearly democratic origin.”7 Still, he went on to acknowledge the Carabineros’
strange and troubling disobedience of civil authority.8 Thus, according to Pinto, the
animosity between the Carabineros and civilians did not result from an institutional flaw,
but from the flaws of disobedient individuals.

*

Francisco Zapatta Silva included the essay to be cited here in his 1944 work about the Carabineros,
Carabineros de Chile: Reseña Historica 1541-1944 but did not adequately cite the essay, giving no
date for its publication. But the essay referenced events in 1941, so it must have been written between
1941 and 1944 when Zapatta published it.
†
In Spanish, both tú and usted are the second person pronoun translated to “you” in English.
However, tú should only be used in casual conversation with people you are very familiar with, while
usted is the more polite version, similar to “Sir” or “Madam” in English, but it is used much more
commonly. Using tú instead of usted can be very rude in certain contexts and in some cases, such as
this one, it implies that the person being addressed is inferior. Verb conjugation changes depending
on which form you use.
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Pinto also noted that the Carabineros showed clear and strong bias against lowerclass citizens. The “colonial vices” that “seeped into [the Carabineros], dominated [their]
sentiments” referred to prejudices against lower-class citizens based on their occupations,
social backgrounds, and probably their non-white racial identities in many cases.
Furthermore, the language that Pinto used is reminiscent of Zapatta’s writing that the
influence over the Carabineros was a “psychological occurrence.” Pinto’s statements in
this excerpt clearly demonstrated that the Carabineros did not view the working class as
equal to themselves, but he also implied that this sentiment was not the result of an
institutional problem, although, given hindsight, it is plain to see that it was. At no point
did he write that certain policies, regulations, or orders caused the Carabineros to harbor
an anti-worker mentality. Rather, Pinto wrote about the personal attitudes of the
Carabineros, implying that individuals within the corps maintained prejudices against the
workers.
If Pinto did not believe that the institution itself carried animosity toward the
working class, then why did that animosity exist? In this article, he placed the blame for
the Carabineros’ anti-worker sentiments on the workers themselves. In their daily
activities, Pinto wrote, the Carabineros “have found that, in all cases, adults ignore the
most elemental rules of courtesy and respect for their fellow man and crudely trample on
the principle of our [my emphasis] rights.”9 In this part of the article, Pinto victimized the
Carabineros, claiming that in daily interactions the protesters violated the rights of the
police. This represents a very clear distinction between the perspective of the Carabineros
and that of the workers, who viewed themselves as victims under the Carabineros’
garrote. Pinto added that the state should create institutions similar to the schools that
Ibáñez created for lower class citizens in the late 1920s to educate the citizenry about the
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Carabineros and “civic culture,” or the acceptance of civil authority. The Carabineros, he
insisted, were justified in their acts as a tool of the government that the people had
elected, and the working class had to be educated about this fact.10
Pinto accurately addressed the effects of the workers’ militant attitude toward the
Carabineros on their relationship. But his argument was entirely one-sided, ignoring that
this militant attitude was a response to the Carabineros’ abuses. Furthermore, he removed
blame from the institution as a whole for this strained relationship, failing to see that its
fundamental ideology and political sympathies were evolving. While it is not safe to say
that, by the mid-1940s, the Carabineros’ institution was fundamentally anti-Marxist, the
orders that came down through the institution certainly created such a sentiment within
the individual police officers. Pinto believed that the institution remained a democratic
one merely because it received orders from democratically elected leaders, but at some
point the actions of the individual Carabineros must have altered the identity of the
institution itself, just as these orders altered the identity of the individuals.
Meanwhile, Chilean politicians faced significant turmoil on a much broader scale
in the early 1940s. For one thing, the relationships among the Popular Front parties
became increasingly strained between 1939 and 1941. Joseph Stalin’s non-aggression
pact with Hitler in August 1939 had put considerable strain on the relationship between
the Socialist and the Communist Parties, since the PC closely followed the policies of
Moscow and the Socialists believed the pact delegitimized them.11 Then, as Aguirre
moved further to the right in 1940 and 1941, abandoning agrarian reform and ceding to
many demands of the opposition, both Marxist parties found themselves unable to
reconcile their differences with Radical party. In February 1941, the Popular Front
coalition officially dissolved. Nine months later, a bad case of tuberculosis forced
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President Aguirre to resign and, sadly, it took his life less than two weeks after he left
office.12
Overall, the Radicals, the Chilean Marxists, and working-class citizens who had
put their hopes in Aguirre were disappointed with his failure to reform the political and
economic structures that empowered only the elite upper class. His economic failures
(Again, see Appendix 7 for a more in depth description of these) caused a 91% increase
in wholesale prices and an 83% increase in the cost of living between 1939 and 1942,
putting the working classes in an increasingly difficult situation.13 Thus, many workingclass Chileans saw the Popular Front era as a failed attempt to fit Marxism into the
constitutional structure of the Chilean government. This most certainly fostered antigovernment sentiments in the working class that they expressed in protest and animosity
toward the Carabineros who represented the government.
The next president, Juan Antonio Ríos (1942-1946), also failed to pacify the
workers through economic and social reform. Ríos was a landowner of the Radical party
who was clearly most loyal to the conservative wing of the party.* The only reason that he
won the election was because the PC and PS feared that a vote for his only legitimate
opponent, General Carlos Ibáñez, meant a vote for fascism.14 Within the first two years of
his presidency, both the Socialists and several of the more left-leaning Radicals left his
cabinet in protest against his conservative policies and alliances with the LiberalConservative bloc.15
The fact that Ríos failed to improve the economy further agitated the working
class against the government: the inflation rate averaged 18% between 1940 and 1950,

*

The Radicals had actually once expelled him for being too conservative and collaborating with
Carlos Ibáñez, but since the party had been generally moving toward the right in the late 1930s and
early 1940s, he was able to defeat a more liberal opponent and gain the party nomination.
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more than double the average rate from 1879 to 1940.16 In response to the right-leaning
government and the failing economy, worker mobilization continued to increase.
Between 1943 and 1944 and, between 1945 and 1946, there were 109 and 187 average
annual strikes, respectively.17 It is impossible to examine the actions of the Carabineros
during every strike, but there were some particularly noteworthy conflicts that
demonstrated the extreme measures that the police were taking against these workers. In
January 1946, for instance, the Confederation of Chilean Workers organized a large
demonstration in response to a recent law that made several miners’ unions illegal. On
January 28, several thousand workers gathered in Plaza Bulnes, directly across from the
presidential palace. It is hard to determine exactly what caused the event to turn violent,
but at some point the Carabineros decided that it was necessary to open fire on the
demonstrators, killing at least two in the process, although sources disagree on the actual
number.18 One leftist newspaper, ¡ahora! Trabajadores, stated that the police killed eight
workers and that “the gathering was drenched in blood because of the police.”19 This
particular source placed blame for the violence strictly on the Carabineros.
It is possible, however, that the workers incited violent reaction from the
Carabineros, perhaps by throwing things or appearing to threaten them, actions that the
police frequently cited as justification for using force. Firing on unarmed civilians was
surely an abuse of power by the police, but their independent judiciary protected the
Carabineros from civilian trial for such crimes, and it rarely prosecuted the police officers
itself.* In response to the incident, known as the Massacre of Plaza Bulnes, several

*

During my research at the National Archives in Santiago I worked through a plethora of
newspapers and magazines published between 1920 and the mid-1970s that represented every part of
the political spectrum. Of all these, I found just one account of legal prosecution against members of
the Carabineros. The article was in the August 11, 1951 edition of Estanquero, a conservative
newspaper that defended the “prestige and honor” of the Carabineros. It did not give any details of
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congressmen, including some conservative Radicals, resigned from President Ríos’
cabinet in protest against what they rightly called police brutality.20 This act of protest
clearly demonstrated the widespread view that Carabineros’ actions against the protesters
were not acceptable given the scenario and their code of conduct. Even the communist
poet Pablo Neruda, Chile’s most exalted writer, protested this incident in his poem, Los
muertos de la plaza:

the crime charged against the two Carabineros officers, and I could not find any other mention of the
incident in other news sources from the same period.
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Yo no vengo a llorar aquí donde cayeron:
Vengo a vosotros, acudo a los que viven.
Acudo a ti a mí y en tu pecho golpeo.
Cayeron otros antes. ¿Recuerdas? Si,
recuerdas.
Otros que el mismo nombre y apellido
tuvieron.
En San Gregorio, en Lonquimay lluvioso,
en Ranquil, derramados por el viento
en Iquique, enterrados en la arena,
a lo largo del mar y del desierto,
a lo largo del humo y de la lluvia,
desde las pampas a los archipiélagos
fueron asesinados otros hombres,
otros que como tú se llamaban Antonio
y que eran como tú pescadores o herreros:
carne de Chile, rostros
cicatrizados por el viento,
martirizados por la pampa,
firmados por el sufrimiento.

In San Gregorio, in rainy Lonquimay,
in Ranquil, scored by the spendthrift wind,
in Inquique, covered up by the sand,
along the sea and the desert,
through the smoke and the rain,
*
from the pampas to the archipiélagos
other men have been murdered,
other with names like Atonio, like your name,
fishermen, blacksmiths, men with jobs like yours:
the flesh of Chile: faces
scarred by wind-lash,
tormented by the pampas,
the signature of pain.
All along the ramparts of our homeland,
bright at the edge of the glass-glitter of the snow,
hidden behind the maze of the forested river,
under the nitrate and the fuse of the bursting seed,
I found thick-strewn the drops of my people’s blood.
2
And each drop, like fire, it burned.

Yo encontré por los muros de la patria,
Junto a la nieve y su cristalería,
detrás del río de ramaje verde,
debajo del nitrato y de la espiga,
una gota de sangre de mi pueblo
1
y cada gota, come el fuego, ardía.

I do not come to weep here where they fell.
I come to speak to you who are still living;
I address my words to you, and to myself.
Others have died before, remember? Yes,
you remember.
Others with the same names and surname
that you have.

*

The pampas are flat plains to the east, mostly in
Argentina actually, while the archipeiélagos is the
string of islands off of Chile’s Pacific coast. So this
basically says that murder is occurring
throughout Chile, from its eastern boarders to its
pacific islands.
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Neruda’s poem was a powerful homage to the Chileans who died at the hands of the
Chilean armed forces in January 1946. He also recalled several massacres that had
occurred either at the hands of the Chilean army or the Carabineros, including the
Ranquil Rebellion of 1934, the Santa María School massacre in Iquique in 1907, and the
San Gregorio massacre of 1921. By repeatedly pointing out the similarities between the
reader and the victims, he made it very clear that these victims of the Carabineros were of
working-class origin: fishermen, blacksmiths, nitrate workers and farmers. They were, in
his words, “the flesh of Chile.”
The first lines of Neruda’s poem reveal, however, that he intended more than
homage to the dead. By stating that his goal was not to “weep” where these people died,
but to “speak to you who are still living,” Neruda issued something of a call to arms for
the Chilean people to recognize the oppressive nature of Chile’s armed forces and stand
against them.* Los muertos de la plaza adequately portrayed the viewpoint of much of the
Chilean working class, particularly the more militant Marxists: their family members and
fellow workers were dying unnecessarily at the hands of the army in conjunction with the
Carabineros, and this unjust trend could not be ignored.
In the same month as the Plaza Bulnes massacre, January 1946, President Ríos
had to resign from his position due to terminal cancer and he passed away just five
months later. In the September 1946 elections, Gabriel González Videla, respresenting
the PC and the left wing of the Radicals, won the most votes (40.1%).1 Since this was not
a true majority, however, Congress had to either confirm his presidency or call for new
elections. González immediately began bargaining with various members of the
*

Indeed, the oppressive forces of the government considered Pablo Neruda to be a great threat
because of his ability to stir anti-government sentiments in the people. Neruda died of heart failure
on September 23, 1973, twelve days after the coup against Allende. Many believe that, like several
other prominent, leftist Chilean artists, the post-Allende dictatorship killed Neruda to stop the
spread of Marxist ideals.
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legislature to win their support. While he stated that, “there is no power, human or divine,
that can break the links which bind me to the Communist party and the people,” he
nevertheless conceded places in his cabinet to members of the Liberal Party and agreed to
firmly oppose agrarian reform and rural unionization. Thus, while securing the
presidency by a wide margin (136 votes for, 46 votes against),2 González embarked upon
a path of extreme compromise even before assuming the presidency.
González demonstrated his self-proclaimed allegiance to the workers early in his
administration (1946-1952) by standing up for a PC-sponsored mining strike in October.
González refused the U.S. State Department’s request for government intervention in the
strike, forcing the Kennecott mining company to work within the Chilean legal
framework to end it.3 Despite this act, the president quickly changed his outlook toward
labor mobilization and the Marxist parties. In March 1947, the Radicals and Liberals
withdrew from González’s cabinet, signifying the president’s loss of their parties’ support.
The president asked the communist cabinet members to resign to appease the Radicals
and Liberals, and the PC complied, expecting to be reinstated in a new cabinet. González
did not, however, follow through on this expectation, and the Communists mobilized
their union-based shock-troops in response, openly opposing the government.4
Why had González overtly betrayed the Communist Party to whom he had
pledged unwavering allegiance just six months earlier? Perhaps it was pressure from the
U.S. State Department, which had stopped loaning Chile money after the Kennecott mine
strike, or the March 1947 declaration of the Truman Doctrine, a watershed event in the
Cold War. Indeed, Chile had been politically tied to the U.S. since entering the Allied
camp under President Ríos and its foreign policy often mirrored that of the U.S. González
signed the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance act in 1947, for example,
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obligating Chile to aid the U.S. and other participating countries in the event of an
attack.5 It is also likely that González personally felt that the PC was becoming too
powerful as it controlled the majority of Chilean unions and, until March 1947, had the
strongest influence within his cabinet.
González’s new disposition toward the PC was sure to affect the Carabineros. For
one thing, it meant that González would now be inclined order the Carabineros to use
force against protesting workers, unlike the October 1946 mining strike when he stood up
for them, because he no longer aligned as closely with the proletariat. The González
presidency could have been a period during which the Carabineros did not specifically
target the working class, which could have altered the trajectory of their evolving identity,
but this was no longer the case. Furthermore, his betrayal of the Communists directly led
to violence in the streets because the PC encouraged the workers in its unions to protest
the government. This meant that the Carabineros were not simply trying to maintain order
during strikes, but fought very militant workers who openly protested the government.
The González administration and the Carabineros were not the only ones targeting
the Communists as a threat in the 1940s. In late 1946, members of the Radical, Socialist
and Liberal parties founded the Ación Chilena Anti-Comunista (ACHA), an anticommunist organization. This paramilitary force had thousands of members from a broad
spectrum of political parties, all joined against the communists.6 Conflict between
mobilizing communists, the Carabineros and the ACHA became increasingly common
after González betrayed the PC. A strike of Santiago bus drivers in June 1947, for
example, ended with four men dead and at least twenty wounded after it degenerated into
violence.7
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Despite the fact that the government and the Carabineros targeted the Marxist
workers, it appears that the Carabineros were not responsible for the deaths during this
strike: the communist paper El Siglo reported that the Carabineros acted “courteously”
during the strike. It went on to report that a Carabineros official complimented the
workers when he saw the protest begin to dissolve peacefully, when suddenly, “from
their cars, the provokers [ACHA] lanzaron fuego graneado on the people.”8 “Lanzaron
fuego graneado” literally means that they “launched rapid fire,” but it is very ambiguous
and could refer to literal shooting or the rapid throwing of objects such as rocks and
bottles. This instance showed that the Carabineros still had the capacity to act in a
professional, non-abusive manner. Despite the fact that anti-Marxist sentiment was
growing among the Carabineros’ ranks, it had not engulfed the disposition of the entire
institution.
The events of this strike demonstrated that communists faced opposition not just
from the government, but also from Chilean citizens who wanted to openly fight them in
the streets. Indeed, anti-communist sentiment was strong, as demonstrated by the
conservative newspaper Estanquero’s 1947 accusation that, “Soviet cells continue to
operate in all parts of Chile.” This particular article went on to say that teachers in La
Cisterna* and all over the country were instilling “in the little ones ideas that will evolve
into revolutionary acts and wild hatred against the country that freely educates them.”9
Clearly, González and much of Chile blamed the communists specifically for the
violence that characterized Chile in 1947, despite instances such as the bus drivers’ strike
when the ACHA was responsible, and this antagonism grew into intense oppression as
the year 1947 progressed. In August and October, for example, the coal miners in the

*

A commune in the southern part of Santiago.
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south of Chile went on strike, and on both occasions the president enacted emergency
powers in the region, using the Carabineros in conjunction with the military to force
workers back into the mines.10 Despite the complete legality of the strikes, González
issued these back-to-work decrees, censored the communist press, and seized food from
the homes of the strikers in an effort to squeeze their resources and force them back to
work.11 He conducted all of these actions using the Carabineros and the military. This was
a clear departure from his defense of the copper miners against pressure from the U.S. in
late 1946. Then, after González had peacefully negotiated copper miners in
Chuquicamata to go back to work, the PC seized control of the local union, convincing
the workers to cancel their arbitration deal. A furious González jailed the local PC
organizer as well as several other communist leaders and shortly afterwards he formally
broke off relations with the PC and all communist nations.12
Then, in July 1948 González signed the Law for the Permanent Defense of
Democracy Act. This law, which the left referred to as the Ley Maldita or Accursed Law,
outlawed communism and eliminated over 20,000 Chileans from the voting register. It
banned strikes by public workers, heavily censored the left wing press, and established a
detention camp for communist leaders in the old nitrate mine of Pisagua.13 And yet this
was still not a strong enough measure for some right-wing Chileans and thus, between
September and October 1948, General Ramón Vergara Montero, General Ibáñez and
several others tried to persuade González to assume dictatorial powers in order to more
completely extinguish Marxism. If González refused, the conspirators planned to
overthrow the government and make Ibáñez president, but González discovered this plan
and rallied the more loyal military officers to his side before any action came to fruition.14
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Once again, the military showed that it would remain out of the political sphere despite
the rabble rousing of a small number of conspirators.
Even after banning the PC, González still had to turn to the Carabineros and the
rest of the armed forces to completely quell them. In June 1949, for example, the
Carabineros attempted to break up a covert communist meeting in Santiago in the Teatro
Caupolicán and ended up in a shootout that left four policemen dead and twenty civilians
wounded. Then, in August 1949 a student protest against increasing bus fares led to
rioting in Santiago. Unable to end the violence with just the Carabineros, the Moneda
ordered armored military units to enter the capital.15 This incident was indicative of the
trend of cooperative oppression between the Carabineros and the Chilean military against
labor movements that had been evolving over the past decade.
Yet, despite these repressive actions, political mobilization continued within the
working class. Almost two thousand sulfur miners went on strike in May 1950; 30,000
miners, gas and electric workers in various regions struck in June 1951; 10,000 leather
workers went out in August 1951; and 18,000 coal miners struck in May 1951.16 Mundo
Obrero, the source of these numbers, reported that these protesters frequently resisted
armed intervention from both the Carabineros and the military, but never backed down in
the face of oppression. Thus, despite the banning of the Communist Party and repression
from the armed forces, it seems that a spirit of protest remained deeply embedded in the
Chilean workers.
The 1940s saw three different administrations, two of which the left elected with
high hopes that they would create meaningful social reform (they elected Ríos merely to
avoid Ibáñez). Instead, growing hostility toward Marxism by these presidents and much
of the Chilean population characterized the 1940s. The Carabineros also began to reflect
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these anti-Marxist sentiments in their daily interactions with the workers. The national
police demonstrated that constantly targeting the working class affected their personal
dispositions toward them, as shown by the plasterers’ strike and Pinto’s remarks about
the “colonial vices” that “dominated [the Carabineros’] sentiments.” Furthermore, in no
way did the Carabineros shy away from using excessive force, but were frequently
responsible for the shooting and killing of unarmed civilians.
True, the Carabineros did not discriminate against the working class in every
scenario and they sometimes acted in a professional manner while dissolving protests.
This indicates that the identity of the institution, how it defined itself, was not
fundamentally anti-Marxist, anti-worker, or anti-left by the close of the 1940s. The
institution itself did not create hostility toward the working class within the individual
Carabineros, the actions that the executive ordered them to carry out did. Perhaps, if
González had stuck to his original ideologies and not oppressed the workers, as in the
October 1946 mining strike, rapidly improving relations between the Carabineros and
workers would have characterized the late 1940s. Unfortunately, this was not the case
and, as Chile moved into the latter half of the twentieth century, the Carabineros’ identity
and their role in national politics continued to develop in the context of growing hostility
between the left and right.
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V. Drawing a Line in the Sand: Political Polarization
When the 1940s came to a close, the old party system was essentially destroyed
because various political allegiances had split the major parties. The Socialist Party alone
divided into three separate factions by the late 1940s.1 The political parties were so
divided that the 1949 congressional election saw eighteen different parties fielding
candidates and fourteen of them had enough support to win seats.2 One of these fourteen
was the newly formed Agrarian Labor Party (PAL), under which the former dictator and
frequent coup conspirator, Carlos Ibáñez, won a congressional seat. This divided and
extremely polarized polity augmented civic unrest because opposing ideologues, the
ACHA and Marxists, for example, openly fought in the street. The Carabineros’ role was
something of a violent mediator that quelled unrest, but it had most certainly targeted the
left more than the right. By the end of the González administration in 1952, the Chilean
people were desperate for a candidate who was above political squabbling and could
unite and pacify the citizenry.
The 1952 presidential election was crowded with candidates from a range of
political parties. The major parties, the Radicals, Socialists and the Liberal-Conservative
bloc, all ran candidates on well-defined platforms (the PC remained illegal). The
candidates included Salvador Allende, for the PS, who proposed radical changes for the
time, most notably the state seizure of copper mines and other major industries. Carlos
Ibáñez joined the race as well, running under the PAL with a deliberately vague political
platform, attempting to appeal to the Chilean people’s disenchantment with the current
political parties. The Chilean magazine, Topaze, wrote that his supporters, “guided more
by instinct than by any rationale, doctrine, or values, cried out to Ibáñez as one would cry
out to a policeman when in danger of being attacked.”3 In fact, Ibáñez did not even read
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his official political platform until after it was published but promised to end nearly all of
Chile’s problems without a clear plan of action. He famously stated that he would end
inflation by declaring, “I will be able to do it because it is my will.”4 This statement had
clear echoes of his inclination toward dictatorial rule, an inclination that he did not try to
deny; instead he promoted Chile’s need for authoritarian rule. His party’s newspaper,
Estanquero, even wrote that Chile needed to move toward an Estado Portaliano, a state
based on the totalitarian politics of the former dictator Diego Portales (1793-1837). In
one article, titled “Dictatorship and Legality,” the author wrote that when the people
convert into, “organized masses, the government becomes a puppet, toys of the masses
and paid political constituents.”5 Based in this logic, Ibáñez appeared to be the figure that
many Chileans longed for who could rise above inter-party bickering and bring about
substantive change while pacifying militant activists.
Ibáñez’s appeal to this widespread anti-party sentiment won him the presidency,
receiving 46.8% of the popular vote and a swift confirmation from Congress.6 During the
confirmation process, a group of army officers created a secret group, “For an Auspicious
Tomorrow” (PUMA), that prepared itself to intervene with military force if Congress did
not ratify the election. Clearly, the former general still had the loyalty of Chile’s armed
forces and an inclination toward the use of force to deal with domestic issues. Thus, the
new president, and highest commander of the Carabineros, was not only prone toward
dictatorial power, but also had the closest ties to the military of any democratically
elected president of the twentieth century. For these reasons, authoritarianism and close
ties to the military greatly affected the evolution of the Carabineros during the second
Ibáñez administration (1952-1958).
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The president began his administration by working with the left, even inviting
some Popular Socialists into his cabinet. He worked with the Central Unica de
Trabajadores (CUT), the new trade union federation founded in 1953, discussing the
repeal of the Ley Maldita that outlawed communism, as well as a minimum wage law and
other worker demands.7 Despite the CUT’s willingness to engage in dialogue with Ibáñez,
however, it was still a vehemently anti-government organization. In fact, when Ibáñez
invited one of its senior members into his cabinet, the other CUT officers expelled him
from his position in the federation.8 President Ibanez, they rightly suspected, was not
truly interested in building an economic strategy based on the wishes of the left, but
simply tried to appease striking workers. Indeed, he followed rightist economic policies,
attempting to reduce government involvement in the economy: in 1953 he reduced
taxation on the two controlling U.S. copper companies, Anaconda and Kennecott, from
92.2% and 79.7% to 50% for both. His strategy paid off and overall copper production
soared by 33.3% during his administration, while further solidifying U.S. interests in
Chile and the country’s politics.9
Relations between the Ibáñez administration and the workers that started off fairly
well fell apart quickly after the minister of the interior denounced the CUT as an “illegal
organization” in October 1953.10 Then, in the first months of 1954, a strike in the copper
mines inspired workers across several industries to go on strike and President Ibáñez
responded by declaring a state of siege (i.e., martial law) in the northern mining regions,
Valparaíso, and Santiago.11 Using the military in conjunction with the Carabineros,
Ibáñez proceeded to censor the press and imprison several CUT leaders, using both the
Carabineros and the military to carry out his orders. Among the arrested was the CUT
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president and primary founder, Clotario Blest, whom the president imprisoned for
attacking the government at a CUT event in May.12
Congress rather quickly ended Ibáñez’s state of siege, but conflict between the
workers and the government was far from over. While the CUT galvanized the working
class, as well as many of the political parties on the left, living conditions rapidly
deteriorated for the lower class. The cost of living rose by 71% in 1954 and 84% in 1955
and copper revenues began to fall drastically after the end of the Korean War.13 Hoping to
stabilize the economy, Ibáñez invited a U.S. consulting firm with a well-known laissezfaire bias, Klein-Saks, to devise a solution to Chile’s economic problems. While
Congress only approved a handful of their recommendations, the left saw Klein-Saks’
presence as a form of U.S. infringement on Chilean sovereignty. The polices achieved the
primary goal of ending the chronic inflation, which dropped to 38% in 1956 and 17% in
1957, but unemployment continued to rise and the poor bore the costs of deflation* as
industries contracted their spending.14
Difficult living conditions in combination with encouragement from the CUT to
mobilize caused growing unrest within the working class, which manifested itself in
widespread protest. As could be expected, Ibáñez attempted to quell the protests with the
use of the Carabineros and the military, a collaboration that was becoming ever more
common. ¡ahora! Trabajdores published an article in 1957 stating that the protesters
during this period were, “not communist, nor socialist, nor radical,” but they were
citizens who protested because they could not survive without bread. The author went on
to say that the government unfairly oppressed these citizens in its attempts to extinguish
*

While deflation increases the value of currency, it has several downsides that most often fall onto
the lower class. In a very basic explanation, this occurs because when prices are falling with deflation,
demand falls because people (and companies) believe things will cost less in the future. This lack of
demand causes lower production which, in turn, leads to unemployment.
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communism completely, wrongly identifying all protesters as communists.15 Many
protesters probably did not have strong political allegiances, especially during these
years; they protested simply because living conditions were particularly awful.
Nevertheless, the CUT and Marxist parties bore the responsibility for instigating the
protests and the Ibáñez administration, along with the Carabineros and military, viewed
the protests as Marxist. This meant that the Carabineros, working with the military,
targeted not only Marxism during the 1950s, but also all parts of the working class that
mobilized.
In addition to squashing protests, Ibáñez’s administration somewhat obsessively
fought the Communists who operated underground illegally. Although illegal, the PC was
still involved with the CUT and the instigation of protests. In September 1955, for
example, the government declared another state of emergency citing, “information of a
new seditious plan by Communist elements determined to paralyze the most important
industries in the country.”16 In February of the same year, Ibáñez had met with several
colonels of another military group associated with PUMA, Línea Recta, in order to hear
their plans to secure dictatorial powers for the president through force so that he could
save Chile from “international Communism.” Other members of the military heard about
the plans, and the entire conspiracy became public knowledge before any action could be
taken.17 Although President Ibáñez never outright supported this plan, the fact that he
entertained the idea shows that he was hardly less power hungry than he had been when
he took control of Chile by force in 1924. Furthermore, the movements of the groups
within the military such as PUMA and Línea Recta demonstrated that, like the Chilean
citizenry and politicians, members of the armed forces believed that they needed to
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choose a side in the struggle between the left and right. This was becoming increasingly
true for the Carabineros during the Ibáñez administration as well.
As was the case in 1936 with the creation of the Popular Front against President
Arturo Alessandri, in 1956 President Ibáñez acted as a catalyst for the creation of a new
political alliance. In March, the Socialist, Democratic and Communist parties created the
Popular Action Front (FRAP) and doubled their collective number of congressional seats
to 24 in the March 1956 elections.18 This event marked a clear loss of power for Ibáñez
and the PAL, and demonstrated the consolidation and strength of the left. Despite the
congressional victory for working-class parties, however, widespread abuse against
protesting workers continued.
In January 1956, the newspaper ¡Arriba! reported that the Ministry of the Interior
had given instructions to the Carabineros and the military, “who patrolled the streets in
tanks,” to “detain any person who tries to incite a protest.”19 Then, in November of the
same year, ¡ahora! Trabajadores reported that the Carabineros had assaulted the office of
the communist-oriented newspaper, El Siglo. The same article reported that the
Carabineros had violently removed a vendor of their newspaper from his stand and
arrested him, thus confirming the “fascist character of their actions.”20 These actions by
the Carabineros demonstrated clear political leanings toward the right.
April 1957 saw the most violent confrontation
following protests incited by the student federation,
FECH, about high bus fares. The heavy use of the
Carabineros and the military degenerated into
widespread rioting and looting in Santiago and, in the
end, more than twenty people lost their lives.21 The
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front page of the May 1957 edition of ¡ahora! Trabajdores, pictured to the right,
compared this violence in Santiago to the 1886 riots in Chicago surrounding the
Haymarket Affair, which ended with seven dead police officers, at least four dead
civilians and the subsequent execution of seven alleged anarchists.22 Indeed, time and
time again, President Ibáñez demonstrated his tendency to use the armed forces for
political ends, most often the repression of Marxism.
In general, socioeconomic status and political orientation dictated public opinion
about the Carabineros during this period. In more blunt terms, the wealthy conservatives
still viewed the Carabineros fondly while the poor left vilified them. A Liberal Party
newspaper, for example, wrote that, “The citizenry has seen with pleasure…that its
authorities [the Carabineros], without a single exception, are working for their well-being
and the security of the people.”23 Just six months later, however, a leftist newspaper from
the same region wrote the following:
When you voice your hunger, they apply the law of the garrote; when you try
to organize, you end up in the armpit of the police [as in being detained by
them via a headlock]; when you learn to distinguish the exploiters, they vanish
you into exile.24
The contrast in opinion between those who saw the Carabineros as justly protecting the
citizenry and those who saw them as an abusive force reflected the polarization of both
political opinion and economic status in Chile. It also demonstrated that the Carabineros
acted as a political tool for those who supported their actions against the protesters,
despite constant assurances that they were an apolitical institution.
The Carabineros actively promoted the view that they were an apolitical force
during this time period in order justify their abusive actions, which were directed almost
exclusively at the left. During the 1950s, it seemed that all Chileans, politicians and
citizens alike, were drawing a line in the sand politically, and the Carabineros wanted to
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make it clear that they were not. Rather, as they claimed, their only objective was to
maintain public order. Take, for example, a notice sent out by the director general of the
Carabineros during the first year of the Ibáñez administration promoting this image:
Carabineros should abstain from every political allegiance absolutely and
without question, and even avoid expressing political opinions publically or
privately that could be considered a demonstration of sympathy for certain
ideals or political parties that divide the citizenry.25
Based on the abuses they inflicted against the working class and protesting citizens, as
well as the censorship of the leftist press that the Carabineros enforced, it seems apparent
that the Carabineros had “sympathy for certain ideals or political parties,” namely those
on the right. Yes, they were mostly conducting their activities on orders from the
executive, but this did not necessarily make them politically detached from their own
actions. In fact, the injunction that they could not participate in politics probably made
them even more inclined to oppose the popular opinion of the lower class that they
themselves often came from. They were not allowed to vote, could not attend political
events such as rallies, and were not allowed to discuss political issues. The statement of
Ibáñez’s secretary during his first administration that the Carabineros were
“unassimilated to the popular movement” was just as true in the 1950s as it was in 1931.
As every individual and every institution began to choose sides in the Chilean
political struggle, what influences affected the Carabineros? The fact is, that Marxist
ideology, or even that of the more moderate left, could not influence the Carabineros’
sympathies more than the political disposition of the orders they followed. That is, the
Carabineros followed orders that targeted the left as an enemy and these police were too
politically detached from the working class to sympathize with them. So bound to the
institution of the Carabineros, these individuals adopted the ideology of the political right
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and the view of the left as an enemy. It is as Francisco Zapatta Silva, a member of the
Carabineros, wrote about this influence a decade earlier:
The Carabinero effectively lives bound to his institution; he blends with the
institution, with the exclusive atmosphere that breathes through the rows of
the Carabineros. This influence of the Carabineros corps over its members is
a psychological occurrence...From here, thus, when a citizen incorporates the
corps into his life, it never leaves him willingly.26
Based on Zapatta’s analysis, it was impossible to separate the sentiments of the individual
Carabineros from the institution and its abusive nature since the “influence…is a
psychological occurrence.” The Carabineros only saw the workers and the left through
the lens of the right, a lens that viewed the workers and Marxists as an enemy, and thus
the rightist presidents pushed the individual Carabineros’ political sympathies to the right
each time they ordered the institution to serve anti-Marxist political ends. That is, every
time a Chilean president ordered the police to fight leftist labor movements, viewing
them all as linked to Marxism, the Carabineros developed a more antagonistic view of the
workers and their struggle.
Carlos Ibáñez’s second presidency came to a close in 1958 among widespread
protest and violent encounters between the armed forces and the citizenry. In the year
leading up to the election, the centrist Christian Democratic Party (PDC), born out of the
small Falange Nacional Party, made a congressional alliance with the Radicals and the
Socialists in order to repeal the Ley Maldita, the law that banned the PC in 1948. Their
motivation was not justice for the Communists, but to weaken the strength of the LiberalConservative bloc by reintroducing the PC into official politics. This coalition also
passed an electoral reform law, enfranchising many more people to vote and freeing the
inquilinos from the influence of their patrones by making the ballot secret. This meant
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that the rural peasantry could vote as they wished without the fear of their landlords
punishing them.27
The 1958 presidential election had three primary candidates: Salvador Allende for
the FRAP (now including the PC), Eduardo Frei for the PDC, and Jorge Alessandri for
the Liberal-Conservative bloc. It is safe to say that the results of the election came as a
shock to both the Chilean bourgeoisie and their international counterparts: Alessandri
gained 31.6% of the votes, just barely defeating Allende, who won 28.9%.28 As tensions
surrounding the Cold War were growing, the fact that a Marxist candidate came within
about 33,00029 votes of winning the presidency in Chile frightened the Chilean elite as
well as politicians and businesspeople in the United States. U.S. investment made up 80%
of foreign capital in Chile in 1958 and Allende’s plans for the nationalization of copper
would have greatly hurt U.S. companies, given that $483 million out of the U.S.’s $736
million invested in Chile was tied up in copper mines.30 Needless to say, this close call for
the right was sure to influence Chilean politics as they attempted to curb the growing
popularity of Marxism.
The United States’ worries about Chile falling to Marxism increased even more
on the heels of Fidel Castro’s January 1959 victory in the Cuban revolution. The U.S. put
significant pressure on Chile and the rest of Latin America to join in condemning
Castro’s new Marxist government. Internally, however, opinion about the Cuban
situation was, as with nearly every other issue, extremely polarized. While the left was
often divided about the installation of Marxism via revolution or electorate, they
resoundingly supported Fidel’s revolution. One newspaper, La Calle, insisted that the
FRAP and the CUT give directives to their constituents to go to Cuba and assist in
defending the new government. The article stated, “Sinister intervention of Yankee
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imperialism makes it imperative and urgent to respond with actions, not words, with
action, not romantic declarations.”31 Salvador Allende also spoke out in defense of Cuba,
arguing that, “Any aggression against Cuba is an aggression against the small nations of
the world, against Latin America, and against Chile.”32 Clearly, the view of the United
States as an imperialist aggressor was solidified in the ideology of the left.
As for the right, the Liberals and Conservatives predictably despised Castro and
were ready to support the U.S. The emerging PDC, however, took a mixed stance in
criticizing Castro’s totalitarian nature, but not the ideals of the revolution.33 Alessandri
himself tried to balance these various opinions, but his overarching opinion favored
national self-determination and thus, non-intervention. The delegate that the president
sent to the January 1962 meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS),
Radomiro Tomic, reinforced this stance. Tomic argued that, based on the U.S. State
Department’s logic for cooperative intervention in Cuba, Argentina, Peru and Bolivia
would have been justified in invading Chile in 1958 if Salvador Allende had been
elected.34
President Alessandri did make concessions to the wishes of the United States, and
agreed that the spread of Marxism needed to be quelled in some way. He embraced John
F. Kennedy’s 1961 “Alliance for Progress” plan that proposed progressive reforms – such
as a ten-year development plan that would aid the lower class – in order to subdue
revolutionary inclinations. The most significant aspect of this plan was the enacting of an
agrarian reform law in August 1962. The law permitted the state to buy land with 20%
cash payments down and ten-year bonds, but stipulated that it could only redistribute
abandoned or inefficiently cultivated properties. In all, this only amounted to about
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60,000 hectares* distributed to just over 1,000 peasants, a rather hollow gesture. Still, it
was the first true attempt at creating more equity for the peasantry and it gave them other
benefits as well, such as mandating that landowners improve inquilino housing and match
wages to inflation.35
The fact that this legislation made it through Congress reflected a major shift in
political power that occurred during the Alessandri administration. The 1961
congressional elections were the first clear sign that power was shifting from the Radicals,
who won 39 seats, and the Liberal-Conservative bloc, that won 45 seats. Meanwhile, the
FRAP won 28 seats and the PDC won 59 seats, an increase of 45 seats since 1957.36 (See
Appendix 8 for a breakdown of congressional seats from 1937-1965.) This was a highly
significant event, as the PDC had become increasingly left wing, a shift motivated by a
desire to gain support from the working class in order to overtake the Radicals as the
dominant centrist party. In response to their great losses, the Radicals, Liberals and
Conservatives created a formal coalition in October 1961, the Democratic Front. This
would not necessarily help them win over new voters, but it gave them them a formal
alliance in Congress.37 Both the movement of the PDC toward the left and the creation of
the Democratic Front further indicated the polarization of Chilean politics in the late
1950s. The mentality that everyone had to pick a side moving into the 1960s affected all
Chileans and Chilean institutions, including the Carabineros.
The FRAP and the CUT both worked hard during the early 1960s to shift the
support of the public to the left by encouraging strikes from a wide variety of professions.
Between 1960 and 1961 there were 260 annual strikes, a 50% increase from 1959 and an
indicator of the workers’ desire to become more politically active. This number rose to

*

A hectare equals 2.47 acres.
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400 annual strikes in 1962 and 1963, and hit 564 in 1964.38 Copper miners, steelworkers,
port and railroad workers all struck for higher pay in early 1961, the teachers’ union went
on strike later that year, and a large portion of the country’s doctors did so in early 1962.39
Thus, the left succeeded in mobilizing both blue-collar and white-collar workers.
Predictably, these strikes often ended in violence, as was the case in November
1962 when the inhabitants of the José María Caro shantytown in Santiago attempted to
blockade a railroad. After the police
intervened, the citizens responded by
throwing rocks. The Carabineros then
opened fire on the protesters, pictured to
the right, and killed five civilians.40 Upon
close inspection of the photograph here,
one can pick out at least two citizens in the bottom left who appear to be children.41
Shantytowns, called callampas, such as José María Caro rapidly multiplied during the
late 1950s and early 1960s and were often hotbeds for revolutionary ideals to spread.
They were also home to many of the Carabineros, as the journalist Marc Cooper noted in
his memoir: “The carabineros were generally from workers’ families and often lived in
substandard housing in squatters’ villages – areas almost unanimously sympathetic to the
Socialists and Communists.”42 This shared background did not, however, stop the national
police from killing five civilians in José María Caro.
Most of these callampas were located in Santiago and were a direct result of the
growth of industry: by 1960 Santiago had 28% of the country’s manufacturing and 50%
of industrial labor. The city could not keep up with the influx of labor and thus these
callampas – with no electricity, drinking water, or medical provisions – sprang up on the
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margins. By the mid 1960s, there were an estimated half-million people living in them.43
Such living conditions led workers to mobilize by striking against their employers and
protesting the government that offered insufficient aid. Despite the validity of the
workers’ grievances, the Alessandri administration responded with repression. In the
president’s personal notes from 1963, which outlined some of his plans for possible
legislation and future reform, he wrote the following:
In cases of strikes or closure of factories or businesses or services whose
paralyzation could put in immediate danger the social-economic health of the
population…the government may decree the resumption of work with
intervention from the [the Carabineros] or military….44
The president thus justified the oppression of striking workers on the basis of maintaining
the “social-economic health of the population.” In so doing, however, he had to ignore
the health of the workers who went on strike. Alessandri warranted the use of the
Carabineros and the military as means to an end that favored only one portion of the
population. In this case, he favored the protection of industry at the expense of the health
of the working class. The president frequently supported the Carabineros’ actions, as in a
1963 press release when he stated that the Carabineros had the “most absolute confidence
of the Government,” which recognized their “sprit of discipline…and [the] calmness with
which they complete their duties of maintaining order.”45
As the 1964 presidential elections approached, there were three well-defined
political blocs in Chile. The first two, the FRAP and the Democratic Front, represented
the irreconcilable left and right. The FRAP nominated Salvador Allende as its candidate,
while the Democratic Front nominated a Radical, Julio Durán. During the late 1950s and
early 1960s, it seemed that increasing polarization between these two blocs forced
Chileans to choose a side, because these two ends of the political spectrum could not
cooperate. Furthermore, relations between the left and right had become increasingly
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hostile due to international pressures stemming from the Cold War, as well as unrest from
the proletariat, which so frequently clashed with the Carabineros.
Not wanting to engage in this hostile feud between left and right, many Chileans
put their hope in the third political bloc, represented by the PDC, the largest single party
in Chile at the time. (Refer to Appendix 8, which shows the breakdown of Congressional
seats by party.) The PDC’s candidate, Eduardo Frei, proposed a “Revolution in Liberty”
that basically followed the lines of Kennedy’s “Alliance for Progress” in that it would
offer socioeconomic reform in order to subdue the left’s revolutionary inclinations. As
the Frei himself defined it, his ideology lay between “reactionaries with no conscience”
and “revolutionaries with no brains.”46 Just two years after the Cuban Missile Crisis
(October 1962), the United States considered it essential to keep Chile from electing a
Marxist president in 1964. The following excerpt comes from the CIA’s Senate
committee report on covert action in Chile between 1963 and 1973:
The Central Intelligence Agency spent more than $2.6 million in support of
the election of the Christian Democratic candidate…More than half of the
Christian Democratic candidate’s campaign was financed by the United
States…the CIA mounted a massive anti-Communist propaganda campaign….It
was a “scare campaign” which relied heavily on images of Soviet tanks and
Cuban firing squads and was directed especially to women.47
Obviously, U.S. interests in Chile had exceeded previous levels as the CIA directly
involved itself with Chile’s politics. While Frei was not the ideal choice to combat
Marxism, since he had leftist sympathies, the U.S. knew that he and the PDC could
capture a large portion of the working class vote with their campaign slogan of a
“Revolution in Liberty,” while the more ideal candidate, Durán, could not. Frei promised
that he could bring about social reform for the working class without a revolution, a
direct attempt to usurp the ideology of the Communist Party and sectors of the Socialist
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Party. (See Appendix 9 for a political cartoon with Frei and Castro depicting this.) Frei
won 56.1% of the popular vote and became Chile’s twenty-eighth president.
The complicated party system of the early 1950s simplified, but became more
polarized, over the course of the decade. By Eduardo Frei’s election in 1964, there were
three political blocs that emerged from nearly twenty parties that covered the whole
political spectrum. This was a reflection of political polarization in Chile between the left
and right, during which political parties chose sides, forming the FRAP and the
Democratic Front. Alternatively, the rise of the PDC resulted from the party’s ability to
appeal to those Chileans who wanted to remain noncombatant in an increasingly hostile
power struggle between the left and right. With regard to the evolution of the Carabineros,
the polarization of Chilean politics began forcing them to one side as well.
Consistently employed to target labor movements that the right perceived as
entirely Marxist, the Carabineros became a symbol of the various governments’ violent
oppression of the worker. Roy Hansen, a University of South Florida sociology professor,
conducted a study in 1963 that yielded much insight into public opinion about the
Carabineros and the military. One of the questions, “Would you like the work of
supervising elections to be done by the Carabineros (instead of the army),” revealed some
strong opinions. A staggering 68% of lower-class respondents “spontaneously disparaged
the Carabineros.”48 An examination of specific responses from the working class further
elaborates on their aversion to the national police:
A Cobbler: “I don’t like the Carabineros. They are very overpowering, very
hard…”
A Ceramist: “[The soldiers] are less violent, more gentlemanly, disciplined. They
receive orders and fulfill them.”
A Factory Worker: “They [the police] are very pretentious and almost never
respect the citizen. They club him for anything. They overstep their privileges.
They think all people are corrupt (my emphasis.)”49
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These responses represented a popular opinion about the Carabineros in the 1960s, that
they abused their power. The ceramist’s response also revealed that many did not view
the army in the same light, a difficult sentiment to explain because in the recent years the
military had been just as guilty of abuse as the Carabineros. A possible explanation is that
the military had only recently become so involved, and thus their identity as an
oppressive force was not as ingrained in the psyche of the Chilean workers. The last
response was also very revealing. The notion that, “they think all people are corrupt”
shows that the police embraced the notion of an enemigo interno. They did not view the
workers as people who needed their rights defended, but rather as threats to the social
order that they needed to oppose.
Lastly, a housepainter responded to the question by stating, “The
Carabineros…think they are Gods. Well, the majority of them are only Indians from the
south.”50 The labeling of the Carabineros as “Indians from the south,” was meant to be an
implication of their lower-class background. This is significant because it shows that,
while the Carabineros had been moving toward the right and becoming more hostile
toward the lower class, the socioeconomic origins of the Carabineros had not changed
since their creation in 1927. The Carabineros were truly dissimilated from their own class,
indoctrinated by their institution via the orders they received such that they were uniquely
hostile toward the mobilized workers.
The overall results of this 1963 poll reveal that most workers certainly viewed the
national police as an institution of the right, despite the Carabineros’ assurance that they
were an apolitical force. Was the institution fundamentally rightist, however, or had it
merely acted as a tool for the right throughout the course of its history? It is still difficult
to prove the former because, at this point, the Carabineros’ actions had been consistent
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with their orders. Still, the individuals and the identity of the institution were not
ideologically disconnected from these orders. The Carabineros had been in existence for
less than forty years and their role had been, almost exclusively, to oppress and abuse the
working class during that time. With this in mind, could the Carabineros have developed
into anything but a fundamentally rightist and anti-worker institution by the 1960s? If
Eduardo Frei’s “Revolution in Liberty” failed to pacify the struggle between the left and
right, then this question would likely be answered as the Carabineros would surely have
to choose a side along with the rest of Chile.
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VI. Revolution in Liberty and Civil Strife
Frei’s election and his proposed “Revolution in Liberty” brought great hope to
many Chileans from various socioeconomic backgrounds. Both Frei and the PDC did in
fact seem to represent all Chileans, and the party makeup paralleled this since its
members included everyone from copper workers and inquilinos to bankers and
landowners. Many believed that Frei had the potential to unite a deeply divided Chile and
bring peace and order to the streets, something that would have benefited the public
image of the Carabineros since the government wouldn’t use them to oppress anyone.
The first test of the new administration’s loyalty to the Chilean people came in
April 1965 when, fearing that unrest in the Dominican Republic could result in another
Marxist revolution, President Lyndon Johnson ordered U.S. troops to intervene in the
conflict. Students and other demonstrators took to the streets in Santiago and elsewhere in
Chile to protest U.S. aggression. They even went so far as
to attack the American consulate. Thus, when President
Johnson requested the backing of the Organization of the
American States (OAS), Frei joined Cuba, Mexico,
Uruguay and Peru in their refusal to assist with the
intervention.1 Frei won considerable favor from many
Chileans, represented by the glorifying cartoon depicted to
the right that reads, “Against the ‘Big Stick,’ The Big
Nose!”2 (Eduardo Frei was well known for having a very large nose.) The fact that the
person Uncle Sam is beating in the cartoon has dark skin and is dressed in clothes that a
peasant would have worn was meant to show that Frei defended all Chileans, especially
the lower class.
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President Frei’s reforms and increasingly
strong stance against the U.S. were still not
enough for some Chileans and, as a result, 1965
saw the creation of a new ultra-leftist group. A
faction of students in the University of
Concepción founded the Movement of the
Revolutionary Left (MIR) in August. This small but very active group advocated for a
Cuban-style revolution and often bore the blame (rightfully) for outbreaks of violence at
otherwise peaceful protests. The Spartacus Movement was another student organization
that declared in 1965, “the student struggle openly stands against the Ministry of the
Interior.”3 Standing against the Ministry of the Interior was synonymous with standing
against the Carabineros, and the Spartacus newspaper, Combate, frequently published
photos, such as the one above, that demonstrated police brutality.4 Unlike the one-sided
view of many leftist newspapers that almost exclusively showed police brutality,
Combate also showed photos of students
attacking police, but they did not do so for the
sake of journalistic neutrality. The caption under
the photo to the left, which appeared on the same
page as the photo above, reads, “A valiant
response from a student against the Carabineros’
brutality.”5 The overt, published glorification of
violence on the part of the protesters demonstrated that hostility between the police and
the citizenry had greatly intensified in the 1960s. Yes, there were supporters of violence
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against the police before this time, but this support was far less overt and certainly did not
regularly appear in newspapers in such a glorified manner, even the most extreme ones.
A year later, this hostility climaxed in one of the most infamous uses of deadly
force by the Chilean armed forces against citizens in the period between the Ibáñez
dictatorship (1927-1931) and that of Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990). In March 1966, Frei
sent the military to aid the Carabineros in ending a strike at the El Salvador copper mine,
the president now bending to the will of the U.S. since the U.S. based Anaconda
Company owned the mine. When the striking workers refused to leave their union hall,
troops led by the soon-to-be famous Augusto Pinochet opened fire on them, killing six
men and two women and wounding thirty-seven people.6 Subsequently, the president
made his stance very clear when he came to the defense of the troops, blaming the
Marxists for causing the violence and thus weakening the integrity of his centrist stance
by taking a side against the leftist workers.
The president’s position also weakened public trust in his government and further
polarized the Chilean polity. One newspaper immediately disparaged the so-called
Revolution in Liberty for being “stained with the blood of the proletariat.” The article
stated, “They all [the previous governments] have applied repressive methods to crush
the just petitions of the wage earners…The same government has massacred women,
workers and children in El Salvador.”7 The article accused the PDC government of being
no different from the previous oppressive governments, essentially labeling Frei’s
revolution as a farce. Clearly, Frei was failing to unify all of the Chilean people.
In the period that followed, this sentiment was one that became widely shared
across the political spectrum. Frei’s own party split into three segments shortly after the
March 1966 conflict at the El Salvador mine: the oficialistas remained loyal to the
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president, the rebeldes wanted a stronger government with more radical leftist policies,
and the terceristas sought neutral ground between the other two.8 In the same year, the
Liberals and Conservatives officially declared themselves as one party, the National Party
(PN). Although a mere formality as they had worked together since the 19th century, the
formal conjoining seemed to imply that they were gearing up for a more contentious
political struggle.*
While the PDC suffered internal divisions and the right solidified its
collaboration, the left struggled with internal divisions of its own. In November 1967, the
Socialist Party officially redefined itself as a Marxist-Leninist organization that aimed at
the creation of a “revolutionary state.”9 This was a reflection of Frei’s failure to create
reform and unite Chile. Not all in the party agreed, including Salvador Allende, who
continued to promote an electoral strategy. As for the Communist Party, they sided with
Allende’s faction of the PS, choosing to remain loyal to the electoral strategy that they
adopted when they reentered politics in an official capacity in 1958. Earlier in 1967,
divisions within the PDC also intensified and the rebeldes and terceristas swayed enough
members to gain party control, thereafter pressuring Frei to pursue a “non-capitalist way
of development.”10

*

Another probable motivation was that their shared stake in Congress had dropped from 45 seats to
10 seats in 1965, while the PDC’s rose from 59 to 82. Meanwhile, the radicals dropped from 39 to 20
and the Marxists rose from 28 to 30 seats.
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Two major reforms resulted from this 1967 power shift within the PDC: the
expropriation and redistribution of over 1,300 haciendas by the end of Frei’s
administration in 1970; and the “Chilenization” of U.S. owned copper, by which the
Chilean government obtained 51% of the two major companies. (See Appendix 10 for a
more detailed description of these two reforms.)
Despite these progressive reforms, Frei failed to
pacify the working class. In fact, his plan to pay for
the reforms incited a nation-wide strike.
President Frei’s plan was to withhold the 5%
wage readjustment for public employees, an annual
increase in their salaries meant to offset the effects of
inflation. The workers would receive the promised
increase in a 1-year bond called a chiribono and also give up the right to strike for the
year. The CUT responded immediately with a call for a national strike, which resulted in
the police killing four workers and a child.11 In the picture here, published by Unidad
Proletaria in December 1967, two Carabineros uncover a “stiff and bloody” body so that
a family member can identify it.12 The same newspaper claimed that seven, not four,
workers died in the strike and wrote of the militarization of Santiago:
The violence did not arrive in Santiago by the fault of the workers. The
government did not hesitate to cordon off peripheral populations [callampas] by
surrounding them with soldiers armed with artillery, tanks, helicopters, armored
cars, rifles and bayonets. They converted Santiago into a giant camp of military
operations.13
This article demonstrated that the government was fully relying on the military to join
with the Carabineros in the repression of the labor movement. The army was no longer a
supplementary force, but fully integrated into the daily operations of maintaining
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domestic order. This was mostly because violence had become so intense, and further
increased the Carabineros’ trust in the military by building a stronger professional
relationship. The article also demonstrated that one of the main goals of the government
and of the armed forces was to quarantine the unruly lower class by surrounding certain
sectors of the city.
This motivation to target the inhabitants of the callampas to subdue labor
mobilization troubled many in Chile. The journalist Ramon Fernandez pointed out the
hypocrisy of the Frei administration, which claimed to support the proletariat, by quoting
the president’s campaign statement about worker mobilization, which had expressed
sympathy for their plight:
These people [residents of the callampas] live as we know they live. They suffer
as we know they suffer. If we were in the same case as them, would we really be
so moderate? What is the punishment for them? At their first action, the poor
receive bullets.14
Clearly, Frei had gone back on his previous opinion that the government wrongfully
oppressed the poor by now ordering the very same oppression he had condemned. Recall
that he even supported the massacre at the El Salvador mine, blaming the very people that
he defended during his campaign for the violence that occurred just a few years later. By
1967, Frei was fully employing the Carabineros to subdue political opposition when it
took the form of popular mobilization, and he used the military alongside the Carabineros
more than any president had before.
But the violence was by no means one sided. The
newspaper Unidad, for example, glorified teachers on
strike throwing rocks at police (pictured to the right).15
The caption under the photograph read, “Throughout the
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country we have observed great combativeness in the national strike declared by all the
workers. The teachers amply responded to the call.”16 The teachers and other strikers in
1967, as well as the formation of openly revolutionary groups such as MIR and the
Spartacus Group, mirrored the trend seen during the plasterers’ strike in 1941 wherein the
Carabineros became more violent as the strike progressed, viewing the protesters as an
enemigo interno. The workers responded to violence on the part of the Carabineros by
becoming ever more militant, especially during the latter half of the 1960s. Take, for
example, the “Song of the Teachers’ Struggle,”* written in 1968 by Angel Guardia
Espinoza, the vice-principal of a Santiago school:
The illusion of police strength can do nothing
to greatly injure the teacher.
Neither the jet-streams of water [from hoses] nor the tear gas bombs
manage to calm his energy or shatter his idea,
and after every demonstration in the street,
each treacherous blow at the student or the teacher
strengthens the movement and our conviction
for which he will fight with more vehemence.17
The song’s rhetoric was a clear response to the abuses of the Carabineros and, although it
does not mention them explicitly, the military as well since they, too, were very active in
the repression. Moreover, we can extrapolate a militant attitude from the song’s
insistence on responding to these abuses by fighting with “more vehemence.” This
mentality reflects Neruda’s poem calling for action after the 1946 Plaza Bulnes Massacre.
The events of March 1968, which began a surge of militarization from the left that
soared to new heights, reflected the rhetoric of the “Song of the Teachers’ Struggle.” In
that month, some of the more extreme protesters launched a wave of urban terrorism that

*

The Spanish name, Canto de la lucha del Magisterio, could also be translated to the Song of the
Teachers’ Fight. I translated “lucha” to “struggle” because this translation carries the weight of the
whole social movement better than “fight,” but lucha really holds a more combative sentiment than
“struggle” would typically imply.
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included bomb attacks on the American consulate, supermarkets, and the home of a
National Party senator. There was also a bomb attack on the tomb of Arturo Alessandri in
August 1969 and the MIR attempted several aircraft hijackings during this period, one of
which was successful. If the urban terrorism wasn’t enough, the Carabineros also
discovered MIR-operated “guerilla schools” used to train militants in the countryside
near Santiago and the Argentine border in 1969 and 1970.18
The Carabineros and the military did not
abstain from violence either. In May 1968,
Denuncia Popular reported that, “by government
order,” the police injured several 15 and 16 yearolds in “indiscriminate beatings.” The author of
the article went on to say that “This government
and the pueblo* are irreconcilable enemies.”19
Meanwhile, the left’s press continued to paint the Carabineros as the enemy of the
working class, accusing them of “brutal oppression” as the headline above the picture
above reads.20 While the abuses of the police continued during the 1960s, their use of
force was more often understandable given the militant evolution of the protesters.
Still, there were still instances when the police and military met thrown rocks with
gunfire and tear gas, an unequal use of force that was inherently abusive. One such
instance occurred in March 1969 when the Carabineros attempted to evict squatters from
a callampa near the southern city of Puerto Montt. On this occasion, the minister of the
interior, Edmundo Pérez Zujovic, gave instructions for the police to be “tough,” which
*

Pueblo translates to town, nation or people, but most often refers to common-folk and marginalized
groups in society, ie., the working class, instead of an entire nation, a wealthy town or a city. When
used in a context relating to Santiago, the pueblo can be translated into the callampas or the people
who live in them.
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translated into opening fire on the squatters when they began throwing rocks, resulting in
eight dead and twenty-six wounded,21 although some accounts estimate that more than
fifty protesters were wounded.22 It is hard to say if Pérez intended his instructions to lead
to a massacre, although the famous Chilean folk musician Víctor Jara* named him as the
guilty party in his song Preguntas por Puerto Montt.23 Several members of the PDC also
blamed Pérez for the incident, leading to the official split of the party and the creation of
the Unitary People’s Action Movement (MAPU) out of the PDC’s leftist faction.
This split was not the only movement among the political parties in 1969. In
October, the PS, PC, Radicals, several fringe parties and the newly formed MAPU joined
together in the Popular Unity coalition (UP). Their candidate for the coming 1970
presidential elections was an easy enough choice: although he had lost three times before,
they nominated the charismatic Salvador Allende. The right put up the ex-president Jorge
Alessandri and the PDC nominated the long-time ambassador to the United States,
Radomiro Tomic. Using the 1969 Congress as a barometer for support for each candidate,
the right was surely fearful that 1970 would see the first Marxist Chilean president: The
PDC had 29.1% of the seats, the PN had 21.3% and the UP parties constituted 38.6%.24
This prospect obviously worried the country’s leading capitalists, as well as the
U.S., which had been intruding into Chilean politics for some time now – their monetary
support for Frei in the 1964 elections, for example. Towards the end of 1969, three
generals from the Pentagon dined with five Chilean military officers in Washington.
When one of the Pentagon official asked what the army would do if Allende won the
coming election, Chilean General Toro Mazote replied, “We’ll take Moneda Palace in

*

Víctor Jara, a communist, would go on to write more protest songs against oppression. Only four
days after the 1973 coup, the military dictatorship executed him, making one of the most famous
martyrs of the Pinochet years.
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half an hour, even if we have to burn it down.”25 The United States was quite keen on this
response and during their subsequent meetings these officials devised plans for a coup
should Allende win the election. Henry Kissinger, President Richard Nixon’s National
Security Advisor, reportedly commented, “I don’t see why we need to stand by and watch
a country try to go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people.”26 It is ironic
that the United States claimed to be a model for democracy while simultaneously
planning to violently interfere with Chile’s democratic process. Indeed, the United States
was markedly pro-coup when it came to the election of Salvador Allende.
Coup conspirators were active within Chile as well. On October 21, 1969, for
example, General Roberto Viaux took over command of the Tacna Regiment, Santiago’s
army base, and made an open threat to overthrow the government. In a demonstration of
national unity, a rarity for this time period, almost every political party rallied to support
Frei. The CUT ordered the workers to mobilize in defense and the local garbage truck
drivers even used their trucks to join the Carabineros in creating barricades to protect the
Moneda.27 Even though the PS tried to use the opportunity to seize power, ordering
workers “not to defend the bourgeois institutional structure but to mobilize in support of
their own social and political demands,”28 the other parties’ mobilization proved sufficient
and won over most of the armed forces and the attack never arrived. Once again,
divisions of allegiance to the golpistas, those who wanted a coup, within the military
prevented widespread insurrection. As with the August 1939 Ariostazo, the first sign of
trouble dissuaded any potential participants who were unsure about joining the uprising.
The allegiance of the Carabineros to the government as well as popular mobilization
surely caused divisions within the military to deter the coup from gaining ground.
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Viaux’s coup, which came to be known as the Tacnazo, got the presidential race
started on unstable terms, even relative to the chaos that typically surrounded Chilean
presidential elections. Indeed, many people wondered if Allende would even make it into
office without having to take up arms if elected in September. This concern was so great
that the commander-in-chief of the army and staunch constitutionalist, General René
Schneider, declared the following in May 1970:
The Army is the guarantor of a normal election and that the Presidency of the
Republic will be assumed by the one who is elected by the people through an
absolute majority, or by the Congress as a whole in case none of the candidates
obtains more than 50 percent of the vote.29
This declaration, which later became known as the Schneider Doctrine, sought to reiterate
the professionalism of Chile’s armed forces in the wake of the Tacnazo and rumblings
about the approaching election. Some politicians condemned the doctrine because they
believed that Schneider’s statements implied that the patriotism of the military was in
question. These doubts of the military’s patriotism were, however, merited as
conspirators made contingency plans and the United States prepared for the worst – for
them, the election of Allende.
Declassified CIA documents reveal that, for the 1970 campaign, the agency spent
“from $800,000 to $1,000,000” on a “large-scale propaganda campaign…similar to that
of 1964….”30 in order to create opposition to Allende. There was a lot at stake for the U.S.
in this election: the loss of copper revenues to nationalization, millions of campaign
dollars gone to waste if Allende won, and the loss of another country to Marxism. Cuba
was long gone, the Peruvian military had overthrown its government in 1968 and
installed a very anti-American regime, and the number of Marxist revolutionaries was
growing in both Argentina and Uruguay. Allende also received some outside funding,
approximately $300,000 from Cuba and an equal or greater amount from Russia.31
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Ultimately, U.S. efforts to sway the election proved futile and Allende narrowly won with
36.6% of the vote, beating out Alessandri, who got 35.3%, and Tomic, with 28.1%. The
first democratically elected Marxist president in the history of the world won by less than
40,000 votes, but since he did not win by an absolute majority, Congress still had to
confirm the election.32
Three days after the election General Schneider spoke out against those in the
military who still believed intervention was necessary because Allende would dissolve
the military’s powers. He reinforced the military’s neutrality in the election and stated
that, as for the dissolution of the military, “danger does not actually exist.”33 On
September 10, El Mercurio, one of the most widely read Chilean newspapers that the U.S.
flooded money into for propaganda purposes, insisted that the people mobilize against
Allende.34 On September 15, President Richard Nixon held a meeting with Kissinger, the
U.S. Attorney General, John N. Mitchell, and the Director of Central Intelligence,
Richard Helms. According to the Senate Intelligence Committee that compiled a report in
1975 on U.S. foreign involvement, Helms’ shorthand notes here accurately reflect
Nixon’s instructions:
One in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile!
worth spending
not concerned risks involved
no involvement of Embassy
$10,000,000 available, more if necessary
full time job-best men we have…
make the economy scream
48 hours for plan of action35
Nixon was clearly concerned with the election results and willing to spend enormous
amounts of money on a covert operation, which the U.S. Embassy in Santiago would not
even know of, to upset Chile’s democratic process and prevent Allende from assuming
power. The CIA even went so far as to dole out nearly forty thousand dollars to an openly
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fascist and pro-Nazi party, Fatherland and Liberty, that a lawyer named Pablo Rodriguez
had founded immediately after the election.36 This organization set off several bombs and
spread propaganda against the U.P.
Meanwhile, Viaux was discussing a plan to takeover the inauguration with the
commander of the Santiago garrison, the vice-commanders of the navy and air force, and
General Vicente Huerta, the commander of the Carabineros. According to Viaux, they
wanted the unity of all of Chile’s armed forces for the effort: “it should be the very
Commanders-in-chief and the Director of the uniformed police…[that] join together in a
coup d’etat.”37 Knowing that General Schneider was their biggest obstacle to gaining the
support of the entire military, they unanimously agreed upon a plan to kidnap him. The
fact that Viaux included the Carabineros director in these plans implies that he believed
that he needed the loyalty of the national police for the coup to be successful, something
he had learned from unsuccessful coups of the past. Furthermore, his strategy represented
the evolution of the relationship between the Carabineros and the military wherein they
had become more codependent and trusting of each other during the recent decades of
collaborative fighting against the Marxists.
The conspirators aborted two attempts to kidnap Schneider on October 19 and
October 20 because they wanted to make sure the situation was ideal before taking action.
Then, on October 22, after a U.S. military envoy supplied the conspirators with three
submachine guns, they surrounded Schneider’s car early in the morning. When Schneider
began firing with his pistol, the kidnappers returned fire, wounding him severely. He died
three days later in the hospital.38 The assassination rallied public support to the side of
Allende and even the PDC told its congressmen to vote for him after he agreed to sign an
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agreement not to violate Congress’ authority. The congressmen confirmed Allende’s
presidency in a vote of 153 to 35.39
The 1960s was a crucial decade in the evolution of the Carabineros and their
identity because Eduardo Frei failed to unite Chile and pacify the working class with his
reforms. This failure signified, for many Chileans, that compromise could not be found
between the left and right, and thus the Carabineros would have to eventually pick a side
in this struggle. The evolution of this institution had thus far shown that their disposition
most certainly aligned with the right, even if they claimed to be apolitical. General Huerta
demonstrated this when he sided with Viaux in an attempt to stop Allende’s ascension to
power. Still, the Carabineros showed immense institutional loyalty above all else, and a
cornerstone of their institution was allegiance to the democratically elected president and
the protection of his government. In fact, their constant abuse of the working class was a
reflection of this characteristic loyalty since every president had ordered them to carry
out said abuses. Allende hoped that this characteristic would outweigh the anti-Marxist
nature of the Carabineros.
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VII. Popular Unity Government
Among Allende’s first acts as president was to name new commanders of the
armed forces, including the Carabineros, an action taken by most new presidents in their
first days in office, especially after a change in party control. It is unlikely that Allende
knew who the conspirators in the Schneider assassination were (or he would have
pursued prosecution), but he surely knew of other conspirators within the ranks of the
armed forces. Allende replaced Huerta as director of the Carabineros with José Maria
Sepúlveda; he also replaced the heads of the army, navy and air force.1 Another of
Allende’s very early acts was his order to dissolve the Grupo Móvil – the Carabineros
special forces unit that Presdient Alessandri created in 1936 to fight protesters
specifically – and its outfit of small tanks, water cannons, and light artillery.2 This action
amounted to more of a symbolic condemnation of brutality against protesters than
anything else.
The question remains, why did Allende not do more to purge the ranks of the
armed forces of conspirators and remove power from the Carabineros, a force that had
almost exclusively fought his supporters for the past forty years? For one thing,
discounting hindsight, it is important to realize that it was not easy to identify who
exactly wanted to overthrow Allende, and who merely disagreed with his policies. As for
the Carabineros specifically, Marc Cooper, the American who worked as a translator for
President Allende, described his view on the president’s trust of the national police in his
2001 memoir:
There was also a calculation based on social class in this political gamble. The left
was banking on the modest economic background of most of the police…The
carabineros were generally from workers’ families and often lived in substandard
housing in squatters’ villages [callampas] – areas almost unanimously
sympathetic to the Socialists and Communists.3
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Indeed, the Carabineros widely came from lower-class backgrounds, and they always had.
In 1974, one author looked back on Allende’s decision, commenting, “Allende felt more
secure among the Carabineros, an armed force that was popular and peasant in its
origins….”4 For Allende, it seemed logical to trust the individual Carabineros’ personal
allegiance to their class rather than their allegiance to a tradition of fighting the lower
class. If the history of Chile’s national police demonstrated anything, however, it is that
they overwhelmingly allied with their institutional identity, which had evolved to become
anti-worker, rather than their personal origins, which one would have expected to be proworker. This is far more obvious when looking back at the broad scope of their evolution.
The modest backgrounds of most of the Carabineros did not stop them from allying with
Ibáñez despite popular mobilization in 1931, allying with the military against left-wing
protesters in Santiago in April 1957, or firing on squatters in Puerto Montt in 1969.
Indeed, instances such as these proved time and time again that the Carabineros’ loyalty
to popular, working-class sentiments was basically nonexistent.
Standing in front of the Moneda in 1971, Marc Cooper’s Chilean friend
commented on the Carabineros who guarded the palace, “I just don’t trust these
assholes.”5 This simple sentiment summed up the issue of the national police: although
many factors made them a seemingly worthy body to protect the Popular Unity
government, their history and identity as an anti-Marxist and oppressive force made them
impossible to fully trust. Moreover, it is possible that Allende even shared this mistrust.
But any conspirators within the military were certainly as unsure about the Carabineros’
loyalty as Allende, given their original purpose of protecting the government, so these
national police could still stand as a deterrent to a possible coup.
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Regardless, President Allende really had no choice but to trust the Carabineros
given his strict allegiance to constitutional legality and a peaceful socialist revolution.
That is, he could not eliminate the Carabineros because he lacked the legal grounds to do
so, and he needed some armed force to protect his peaceful revolution should some force,
military or civilian, attempt a violent overthrow. He could not arm the working class
because that would surely cause a violent proletarian uprising and contradict a peaceful
revolution. Allende also needed the Carabineros in order to act against the most extreme
Marxist parties that wanted to produce such an uprising against even his socialist
government. Thus, the success of Allende’s legal and nonviolent installation of socialism
ironically hinged on the loyalty of an armed institution that had spent its entire existence
oppressing the promoters of his basic ideals. And as it turns out, President Allende found
the need to use the Carabineros, and even the military, a handful of times during the first
year of his presidency. Allende largely used the armed forces to combat militant groups
from the right, although he occasionally used them against the unruly left as well.
From his first days, Allende’s economic policies further alienated him from the
right and the United States. In December 1970, a mere month into his administration, he
began plans to nationalize copper.6 U.S. companies collected over $120 million dollars
annually and many believed that Frei’s “Chileanization” of copper was insufficient. In
July 1971, Allende passed amendment through Congress that allowed him to nationalize
all Chilean copper without paying the U.S. companies a single dollar.* Allende also
nationalized many parts of the industrial sector, not even needing Congress’ approval
*

As written into the amendment, the president maintained the sole power of determining the “excess
profits” that U.S. copper companies enjoyed. Allende defined excessive profits to be anything greater
than 12% of the companies’ book value earned after 1955, the year when Ibáñez renegotiated copper
taxation. This meant that the Kennecott and Anaconda copper companies collected $770 million in
excess profits and, since this exceeded the $333 million that the Chilean government owed for
expropriation (based on book value), Allende declared that the two companies owed Chile the
*
difference. Of course, these companies refused but had no legal channels to fight the expropriation.
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because he used a loophole in the form of a long-forgotten law that the short-lived 1932
Socialist Republic had created allowing the expropriation of factories that failed to
operate efficiently. Allende nationalized 47 industrial firms in his first year.7 By late 1973,
Allende’s UP government controlled 80% of Chilean industrial output, over 400 total
enterprises.8
Agrarian reform was also well under way and Allende’s agricultural minister,
Jacques Chonchol, promised to expropriate all farms greater in size than eighty hectares.
It would have taken two years to complete this expropriation, too long a process for the
peasantry, which began seizing land by force.9 These peasants were becoming
increasingly well organized under the direction of the MIR, and land grabbing quickly
spiraled out of Allende’s control. Nevertheless, the president did not want to lose the
allegiance of the peasantry, so he had to legalize the land seizures after the fact. Many on
the right saw this as an abuse of executive power.
Allende’s political opposition, both within Congress and in the street, was
outspoken about their indignation toward his policies. Just six months after the
establishment of the UP government, a right wing newspaper declared that Allende’s
government had already abused its power in “inadmissible ways.” The author went on to
say that the “laws, decrees, regulations and moreover the judicial means that have been
used, with crooked purposes, are meant to create a communist utopia after this tyrannical
socialist phase.”10 In June 1971, the right’s view of Allende’s government as corrupt
became further entrenched when several men whom the president had pardoned during
his initial days in office assassinated Edmundo Pérez Zujovic. Zujovic was the minister
of the interior under Frei, and many believed that he was responsible for ordering many
of the abuses against the working class, particularly the killing of eight people in Puerto
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Montt in 1969. Allende quickly disarmed and dismantled the assailants’ party, the
Organized Vanguard of the People, but he refused to subdue the MIR in anyway as many
in Congress demanded.11
Allende also met resistance to his government from parts of the left who viewed
his actions as too moderate. In 1971, the frequency of strikes increased by 50% and the
illegal seizure of land and factories motivated by the extreme left tripled.12 Allende tried
to slow this radicalization of the left by proposing a law to impose mild criminal
punishment on ringleaders of these takeovers when property damage occurred. Congress
rejected the law, not because they considered it too aggressive, but because they hoped to
make the president either use force to stop the occupations or allow them. The president
chose the latter.
Extreme groups from the right often expressed their resistance to Allende’s
policies with violence. In the first months of the Allende administration, in fact, one
newspaper reported that the police found twenty-one distinct locations that right-wing
guerillas were using as safe houses, armed with explosives made of dynamite. These safe
houses mostly belonged to members of the National Vanguard Liberator (VNL), a
militant rightist group similar to the MIR.13 Then, in December 1971 the mobilizing right
began their most overt protest against the UP government. It was the second to last day of
Fidel Castro’s twenty-three day visit to Chile on invitation from Allende. On December 1,
a terrorist bomb planted by militant rightists knocked out Santiago’s electrical grid and
blacked out the city for several hours.14
The next morning, five thousand women from the highest tiers of Chilean society
staged the infamous March of the Empty Pots, protesting food shortages. They passed out
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leaflets stating, “The Marxists cut off the food from the democratic areas of Chile.” Marc
Cooper recalled the incident in his memoir of the Allende years:
Some five thousand of Chile’s wealthiest women, bedecked in jewels, some in
party dresses, others accompanied by their maids and servants, and all banging
loudly on pots and pans….What a theater of the absurd! Here were the best-fed,
best-clothed, fattest, and wealthiest peoples in Chile, many of whom controlled
and owned the still private-sector food distribution system from top to bottom,
claiming hunger.15
Based on Cooper’s description, there was a clear division of opinion about the situation
in Chile and who was suffering as upper-class citizens felt that redistribution unfairly
diminished their standard of living. Cooper’s take on this famous march deserves merit as
these women surely suffered little compared with the residents of the callampas. Still,
many middle- and upper-class Chileans shared their opinion.*
Cooper continued that this “asinine spectacle” would have caused little fuss if not
for several hundred “helmeted youth stock brigades” from the PDC and NP. Upon
arriving at the city center, they barricaded streets, broke windows, fought unionized
workers, attacked the Communist Youth headquarters with Molotov cocktails, and
attempted to burn down the U.N. building. As the fighting continued into the next day,
Allende declared a state of emergency and passed control of the Carabineros to the army
under Augusto Pinochet, an eerie decision given hindsight of the events that took place
two years later. When the police restored order, they had arrested over one hundred
people and had injured over one hundred and fifty.16
1972 followed a similar pattern, with seizures of factories and farms continuing
along with breakouts of violence between militants from both sides of the political

*

During a conversation with my host family in Chile, my “Chilean aunt” recalled that, during the
*
Allende years, “There was no food to eat. We could not even find bread.” Her propensity for
exaggeration and very strong bias against leftist parties must be taken into account, but her
statements still reveal a prevailing reactionary opinion from this era.
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spectrum. Workers formed cordones industriales, “industrial belts” that were areas of
occupied factories controlled by the proletariat. When the government did not quickly
meet their demands to expropriate the factories, they blocked roads and occupied other
buildings until Allende conceded to them in lieu of mobilizing the police against them.17
The Carabineros probably felt misplaced under Allende, watching the national
government bend to the will of the workers that the police were so used to oppressing.
The few times that the Carabineros did intervene, the press of the extreme left
attacked Allende. Such was the case in July 1972 when a Carabinero shot a resident of a
callampa during a violent encounter and MIR newspapers labeled Allende a murderer.18
These factory occupations greatly impeded industrial production, and as world copper
prices fell Chile’s foreign reserves followed, putting huge strains on their import capacity.
Allende had to choose whether to buy raw materials and machinery parts to aid industry
or buy consumer goods. Opting for the latter exacerbated Chile’s inability to produce
domestically, and as a result the nation’s trade deficit rose from $18 million in 1971 to
$255 million in 1972.19
This growing economic crisis worsened the living conditions for all people and
the situation actually came closer each day to realizing the image that the women of the
March of Empty Pots painted in December 1971. Indeed, black market food sales
developed and Allende imposed administrative controls over the distribution of many
foodstuffs, an action that the right labeled as the first steps toward rationing.20 As early as
March 1972, newspapers promoted the need for military intervention: “…if the Armed
Forces think it necessary to intervene in politics in the future, never should they depart
from their invariable role: to accept, in critical moments, their role as the great tool of
popular aspirations.”21 The same newspaper later defended the notion of an enemigo
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interno, writing that when the armed forces fight a foreign enemy, “they defend the life
of the state. The fight against an internal enemy that tries to demolish the legal
organization is the same thing and has the same valor.”22 This newspaper justified the
military’s open fight against internal enemies and, in this paper’s opinion, the nation’s
greatest enemy was Marxism.
If the military was not prepared to stop Allende’s socialist transition and quell the
working class and peasantry, however, anti-Marxist citizens were still prepared to
mobilize on their own. In October 1972 several thousand truck owners went on strike and
caused the most devastating losses for the Allende administration – some estimate that
the Moneda had to spend upwards of $300 million during the strike to keep the country
running.23 The truckers were some of the most affected by the trade imbalance since they
imported most of their parts and the owners of the companies mostly fell on the political
right. There are claims that the CIA supported the strike with U.S. capital and encouraged
it to continue in order to worsen the economic situation in Chile to the point of a coup.24
The strike eventually spread to other economic sectors and across the entire country,
totaling 600,000 to 700,000 workers at its peak. The left seized the opportunity as well,
occupying more factories, many of which remained permanently in their hands
thereafter.25 Capitalizing on the chaos, the right in Congress also pushed through the Ley
de Control de Armas that same month, October, allowing the Carabineros and military to
search for and confiscate firearms in the cordones industriales.26
Allende relied heavily on the military and the Carabineros to negotiate an end to
this strike in particular, and made an unexpected move in an attempt to strengthen the
various armed forces’ allegiance to the UP. He temporarily altered his cabinet to open
high-ranking positions in it for members of the army, navy, and air force and even made
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General Carlos Prats, commander-in-chief of the army, his minister of the interior. This
dual position made Prats the most powerful minister in Chile in the 20th century, which
paid off when he successfully negotiated an end to the strike in November 1972.27 The
inclusion of these military men in the Allende administration should not be seen as
closing the ideological gap between Allende and much of the military’s officer corps that
remained inclined toward an uprising. The men that Allende appointed to his cabinet
were all well-established constitutionalists and bringing them into the cabinet was the
president’s strategy for appeasing the rest of the military. Still, the president’s decision to
bring them into his administration meant that Allende did not feel entirely secure in his
post; it reflected something of a “keep your friends close, keep your enemies closer”
mentality.
Allende’s strategy worked and all of three of the military men stepped down from
their cabinet posts in accordance with the original arrangement shortly after the March
1973 congressional elections. The UP won 44% in the elections while the right gained a
majority of 55%, but not the 2/3 majority they required to overrule vetoes and potentially
impeach the Allende, so the UP considered the election a success.28 Supposedly, it was
such a surprising victory given the recent political turmoil that Allende closed the door to
his office and danced a cueca* all to himself.29 The celebration was perhaps premature,
however, as the right became more radicalized now that their options for stopping
Allende’s progress had diminished.
Much of the right’s radicalization occurred within the ranks of the military, often
fueled by the public insults they routinely endured. Even General Prats, acclaimed for his
constitutionalism, famously forced a woman who stuck her tongue out at him off the road
*

This is a traditional dance popular in Chile, Argentina and Bolivia. It officially became Chile’s
national dance in 1979.
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in June 1973.30 Two days later, on June 29, a group of tanks surrounded La Moneda in
open insurrection. General Prats led the Carabineros guard in defending the palace and
personally went from tank to tank with a machine gun ordering the rebels to surrender.
The attempted coup ended before it could really begin.31 Once again, divisions in
leadership and the loyalty of some of the armed forces to Allende ended an attempted
coup before it could gain momentum. Nevertheless, the incident shocked the many
Chileans who believed that such an attempt would not occur. Many saw the incident as a
turning point after which one of the extreme ends of the political spectrum had to take
power and crush the other by force. The leftist intellectual journal, Punto Final, published
an article stating, “For Chile, the cards are on the table. It will either be socialism or
fascism – nothing in between.”32 This statement was reminiscent of the growing
polarization between the left and right throughout the 1950s and 1960s, now coming to a
culmination in which the Carabineros would be forced to choose a side.
The golpista generals, those inclined toward a golpe or coup, learned several
important lessons from the June events that the scholar Cristobal Kay pointed out in his
1975 essay about the September 1973 coup. First, the golpista leaders would have to
unite the three branches of the military and the Carabineros in order to be successful –
they could not leave it up to chance which side officers and the rank and file would take
on the day of the uprising. Kay notes that the Carabineros, in particular, “had to be won
over, or at least neutralized” because of their “parliamentary strength.”33 What Kay
referred to here is the Carabineros’ strong connection to Chile’s governing body, a
characteristic that gave their actions unique legitimacy since elected officials, rather than
appointed generals, gave them orders. Thus, if the Carabineros joined the coup, the
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golpistas could more easily justify a coup and claim that the armed forces were fulfilling
their patriotic duty against a tyrant.
Divisions within the officer corps and civil unrest became more intense after the
failed coup in June as well. In July, about 10,000 leftists met in an arena in downtown
Santiago on the pretext of celebrating the anniversary of the Cuban Revolution. Marc
Cooper was present, and he later recalled the divisions within the ranks of the left, some
calling for “Political Consciousness! And Rifles!” while, others chanted back, “Ultraleftism Betrays Socialism,” until the “stirring blood-ecstasy that had inflated the
auditorium popped.” Fighting broke out until the Communists walked out of the stadium
and the meeting came to a close. After the meeting, Cooper’s friend sadly commented,
“You know, we are so close – or rather we were so close. So close, but we aren’t going to
make it. It’s all over brother.”34 Indeed, with the left sharply divided, it seemed
impossible that they could stand firm against the golpistas within the military who were
already preparing for the September coup. More and more each day it became apparent
that Punto Final had been correct in saying that “the cards are on the table” and that it
was just a matter of time before a full swing to either socialism or military rule would
occur.
The coup conspirators moved quickly between the failed June attempt and the
September 11 coup. Using the October 1972 Arms Control Act, the Carabineros and
military began searches in the cordones industriales and other Marxist strongholds within
a week of the failed coup.35 Then, a second truckers’ strike began in July, the same month
as the leftist rally at the arena, but was coupled this time with terrorist acts incited by the
right-wing Fatherland and Liberty party. They blew up bridges, railway lines, and oil
pipelines and attacked the homes of UP leaders. The strike along with the terrorist actions

105

constituted a well-coordinated attack specifically aimed at delegitimizing the UP
government. Many members of the right, both leaders of the strikes and congressmen,
began demanding Allende’s impeachment since he could not establish order.36
Then, at the beginning of August the military began an internal purge of those
who were loyal to the government, mostly low ranking officers. In Valparaíso and
Talcahuano, for example, conspirators arrested and tortured twenty navy men who they
accused of inciting a mutiny.37 The success of purges such as these represented the virtual
helplessness of the government against the autonomous ruling structure within the
military. The most decisive blow to the strength of the anti-golpistas within the military
occurred in the same month when Allende created a second military cabinet as part of his
attempt to end the new truckers’ strike in July. A week later, tensions over the power
granted to the new cabinet members led to the resignation of the air force commander,
General Ruiz, from the cabinet, to which Allende responded by stripping him of his title
as commander-in-chief of the air force.38 Delegations of generals from the army and navy
pressured their own commanders within the cabinet to join in resigning from both titles,
and during the last week in August both General Prats and Admiral Montero agreed.39 As
it turns out, the replacements for these confirmed anti-golpista military leaders were three
of the four members of the military junta that overthrew Allende just a few weeks later.
The only commander that had not been purged was General Sepúlveda, the commander
of the Carabineros.
Surely, it is telling that the golpistas could not preemptively purge the
Carabineros commander, but instead had to use General Mendoza, the Carabineros’
future representative in the post-Allende junta, to covertly persuade lower officers to join
the coup over the next several weeks. Mendoza only declared himself the head of the
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Carabineros once the coup was underway on the 11th. In fact, the conspirators had to go
six places down the chain of command before arriving at Mendoza, a senior officer
whom they believed would prove sympathetic to the coup.40 With the country in worse
disarray from the strikes and terrorist actions, it was simple enough to persuade the
military men that insurrection was necessary. As the scholar Alan Angell wrote in 1974,
“No military force could have stood by and watched while civil disorder grew and while
its own officer corps suffered internal divisions over whether to help the government or
not.”41
So why could the golpistas not push Mendoza into office earlier and why did they
have to go six places down to find an officer who would join their plan? Was the historic
institutional loyalty within the Carabineros, intrinsically linked to a sense of loyalty to the
executive, strong enough not to break under this pressure? And if this was the case, then
why did this loyalty and strength not hold up on the day of the coup when they joined
with Mendoza, a man who only that day had declared himself the leader of the
Carabineros in the midst of an armed insurrection? The Carabineros had always followed
the orders of the executive, and even did so in part during the Allende administration by
fighting right-wing extremists, the National Vanguard Liberator group in particular.
Nevertheless, the institution of the Carabineros had changed fundamentally, such that
these national police had evolved into an incontrovertibly anti-Marxist organization.
Looking at the broad scope of their existence with hindsight, this is apparent, but Allende
and the golpista leaders could not be so sure; it would take an incident such as the
September 1973 coup, when the Carabineros had to choose a side, to expose this
fundamentally rightist identity.
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VIII. A Post Abandoned
When Salvador Allende woke up on September 11, 1973, to a phone call
informing him that a coup was under way, General Mendoza and the rest of the junta
commanders had already convinced enough of the Carabineros’ officer corps to join them
so that the national police would not provide defense for the government. The three
hundred or so Carabineros that walked off of the palace grounds and joined the besiegers
at about 9:00 am confirmed this. The reason that they abandoned their post was simple:
they had watched feuding between the left and right polarize the Chilean people to the
point of absolute chaos and, because of their forty-six year deployment against the
working class, they joined the military in blaming the Marxists for this. By examining the
scope of the Carabineros’ institutional evolution, this reasoning is apparent.
Carlos Ibáñez founded the Carabineros in 1927 in the midst of a similar chaos, but
the turmoil of the 1920s was the result of military adventurism more than popular
mobilization. When Chile returned to legitimate democracy with the election of Arturo
Alessandri in 1932, the threat of this military adventurism more or less subsided, and the
chaos followed suit. This brand new national police force, a mere five years old, had not
developed an established identity at this point of drastic political change. Thus, their
fundamental identity and institutional ideology was malleable and uniquely receptive to
the influence of their environment.
If the history of the Carabineros during the 20th century reveals anything, however,
it is that these largely working-class police were never receptive to the influence of
popular movements, even if the roots of those movements had the interests of their own
class at heart. The Carabineros demonstrated this as early as 1931 during the protest that
included engineers, doctors, professors, students and public workers – a range of
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professions that spanned all social classes. Recall President Ibáñez’s secretary, who
commented that the Carabineros remained fiercely loyal to the president during this strike,
“desperate and unassimilated to the popular movement.”1 This disconnect seems illogical
because, as Marc Cooper pointed out, they “were generally from workers’ families and
often lived in substandard housing in squatters’ villages [callampas] – areas almost
unanimously sympathetic to the Socialists and Communists.”2 Why did the Carabineros
not find common ground with their own neighbors?
The reason that the Carabineros did not sympathize with leftist politics is that they
did not actively associate with any politics. Their internal laws, not being allowed to vote,
for example, made it such that they were not politically minded – they did not seek to
learn about political ideologies or entertain political discourse. Rather than developing a
political allegiance, the Carabineros developed an institutional allegiance. Because of this,
their political inclinations formed more subconsciously than their working-class
counterparts, by way of the orders they received through their institution. These orders
were, for forty-six years, almost exclusively aimed at oppressing the working class in an
effort to fight Marxism.
As early as the massacre of over one hundred peasants during the 1934 Ranquil
Rebellion, this influence over the Carabineros pushed them toward anti-Marxist
sentiment. More overtly political orders occurred as well in the earliest years of the
Carabineros’ development, including the illegal raid on the newspaper Topaze in 1938 by
order of President Alessandri. Although the Carabineros were merely following orders,
the identity of the institution and the individual police officers moved further right with
each violent encounter.
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The 1941 plasterers’ strike demonstrated a microcosm of this evolution of the
Carabineros’ identity. The collective articles published in Nuevo Andamio during the
strike highlighted the evolving anti-worker bias of the national police when they changed
from blaming the government for the actions of the Carabineros to writing, “it is clear
that the police are acting on their own without authority.”3 It did not take long for this
trend to reveal itself as an institutionalized evolution as workers became more militant in
the 1950s and the police, now aided by the military, responded with a heavier hand.
During the 1957 Santiago protests, which degenerated into outright rioting, El Siglo
reported on the “fascist character of [the Carabineros] actions” that resulted in more than
twenty deaths.4
At the same time, the evolution of party politics shows us that a mentality of left
vs. right, in which every person and institution had to pick a side, was developing. The
consolidation of the Popular Front in 1936 against Alessandri was an early indicator of
this, followed later by the 1946 Popular Action Front (FRAP), and eventually the Unidad
Popular (UP) in 1969. On the right, too, the Democratic Front in 1961 and the official
combining of the Liberal and Conservative Parties into the National Party in 1966
showed that all parties were drawing a proverbial line in the sand. The eventual failure of
Frei and the PDC to mediate this trend and unite Chile, made the chaos of the late 1960s
and early 1970s inevitable.
A big reason for this was the reflection of polarized party politics in militarized
citizens. The Spartacus Group and MIR often fought with nacistas and the anticommunist ACHA, but the Carabineros continued to target the left more so than the right.
The national police, now working ever more frequently in conjunction with the military,
killed five protesters in the José María Caro callampa in November 1962, eight more at
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the El Salvador mine in March 1966, four during a national strike in December 1967 and
another eight in Puerto Montt in March 1969.
Furthermore, frequent collaboration with the military greatly altered the identity
of the Carabineros institution as well. The Carabineros became familiar with military
operations, surely developed a stronger institutional relationship – meaning that the two
institutions shared common characteristics in their identities – and came to rely on them
for assisting in restoring order. Recall that Unidad Proletaria wrote in 1967 that the
government sectioned off the Santiago callampas with “soldiers armed with artillery,
tanks, helicopters, armored cars, rifles and bayonets.” Surely the relationship between the
Carabineros and the military was far stronger during and after such instances when they
worked together. Indeed, the Carabineros and the military increasingly shared common
goals, as high-ranking officers collaborated in oppressing the protests and most
importantly, they came to believe that they had a common enemigo interno, the
mobilized workers, perceived as exclusively Marxist.
The Carabineros were likely unaware of the implications of their actions on their
individual ideologies and their institutional identity. Nevertheless, being separated from
political influence outside of their institution, and without a clearly defined identity after
Chile’s return to democratic politics in 1932, the orders they carried out drove their
evolution. The Latin American scholar Danny Gonzalo wrote in his essay about the
Carabineros:
On occasion, the participation of the carabineros has widely been understood as a
body of uniformed police; other times, the active action of a part of the police
hierarchy in political processes; and, moreover, there have entirely been times
when they have been pushed from their role in the public order to take an active
part in situations of relevant national politics (my emphasis.)5
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Gonzalo pointed out the multiple roles that the Carabineros played, ranging from those of
a traditional police force, to acting within politics, to being “pushed from their role…to
take an active part in situations of relevant national politics.” The fact that the
Carabineros were essentially a political tool molded their identity so that they became an
inherently political institution, even when not ordered to be. This evolution caused them
to act autonomously on September 11, 1973, without orders from the executive, and join
the coup against Allende. Thereafter the Carabineros officially became, and remained, the
fourth branch of the military, and actively participated in the imprisonment, torture, and
execution of Marxists during the Pinochet dictatorship (1973-1990). Many see the
Carabineros’ role in the 1973 coup and the subsequent dictatorship as a transition in the
identity of the Carabineros, but this is inaccurate. The 1973 coup did not mark a
transition in the identity of the Carabineros, but revealed that their institution had already
evolved into fundamentally anti-Marxist organization over the course of the preceding
forty-six years.
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Afterword: Los Desaparecidos: A Democracy Unraveled
Los desaparecidos, the disappeared: this is a term that still stings the ears of many
Chileans today. It refers specifically to over one thousand Chileans who disappeared
during the Pinchoet dictatorship (1973-1990), and whose fate is still unknown, but it is
also a term closely associated with the other victims of the military regime. For any
scholarly work to examine Chile during the 20th century and not discuss these victims is a
shameful disregard for the national suffering that the seventeen-year dictatorship caused;
this is the type of disregard that opens the door for these horrific events to repeat
themselves, and it is the type of disregard that is very present in Chile today. According
to the Rettig and Valech reports, conducted by the National Commission for Truth and
Reconciliation and the National Commission for Political Imprisonment and Torture, the
dictatorship was responsible for the execution of 2,197 people and the disappearance of
1,102 more. The agents of the dictatorship, many of whom were Carabineros under the
management of the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA), illegally detained and
tortured at least 28,459 Chileans in over 1,156 detention centers across the country.1
The DINA, responsible for carrying out the dictatorship’s state terror, conducted
political genocide by systematically targeting Marxist-oriented parties. The imprisonment
and execution of Chilean citizens began on the same day of the coup, and then the
dictatorship began targeting different factions of the left in waves: the majority of the
victims in 1974 were of the MIR and Spartacus Group, in 1975 they were mostly
Socialists, and in 1975 they were mostly Communists. The detention centers themselves
were located all over Chile, some of the most famous being the national stadium in
Santiago, where tens of thousands of prisoners passed through, and Villa Grimaldi, a
large estate located outside of Santiago that was the last known location of over two
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hundred of the desaparecidos. Other detention centers were much smaller and more
clandestine. The house known as Londres 38, for example, imprisoned and tortured over
two thousand Chileans in 1975 and is located in a residential area less than a half mile
from the Moneda in downtown Santiago.2 The Rettig report recalled the conditions of
another of these detention centers, José Domingo Cañas 1367, a house on the outskirts of
Santiago:
[The detainees] were kept in a relatively open common room…and in the place
called the pit, el hoyo, which was something more like a storeroom, without
windows or ventilation and approximately 2 x 1 meters in size, was where they
came to keep more than 10 detainees at a time, in extreme conditions of
overcrowding and without air.3
These methods of torture through confinement were some of the most common, along
with electrocution, beatings, and solitary confinement in extremely small spaces. The
goal of these horrific events was to pacify the Marxist movement and labor militancy
through state terror, and the Carabineros carried out much of the imprisonment, torture
and executions. By eliminating the left, Pinochet opened the door for neoliberal economic
reform, supported by the United States via the “Chicago Boys,” who studied under
Milton Freidman at the University of Chicago.
Chile returned to democracy in 1990 by a popular vote, but the effects of the
Pinochet dictatorship on Chilean politics and the national psyche remain irreversible. For
the human rights violations under his dictatorship, Pinochet faced trial in Britain in 1998,
and in Chile in 2004, but no judge ever passed sentencing due to his failing health. He
died in 2006. The victims of the dictatorship and their families have received little in
terms of reparations or recognition, but fight to remind the Chilean people about the
suffering that occurred at the hands of Pinochet and the DINA. Still, even today human
rights activists struggle to bring the victims of the dictatorship to the forefront of national
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social and political discourse, as many Chileans prefer to live in a state of amnesia about
these atrocities. There exists a widely accepted sentiment that it is better to move on and
not talk about the sadness of the past. This refusal to recognize the atrocities of the past,
however, keeps Chilean society from moving forward in the future. Politically, Chile
remains under the rule of the constitution that Pinochet ratified in 1980, blocking
economic and social reforms by locking most institutions within the private sector.
One such institution is education, one of the most contentious issues in Chile
today. Students have been very active over the course of the past decade, calling for
education reform that will bring higher quality and more affordable education to Chile’s
youth. With regard to this activism, the Carabineros have not strayed from their abusive
identity. During my four-month stay in Valparaíso and Santiago in 2013, I frequently
witnessed peaceful student protests broken up by tear gas, small tanks, and brigades of
Carabineros predisposed toward beating students rather than maintaining order. The
modern age has made these abuses better known, particularly through the Internet, but
Chile’s national police continue their oppressive tactics. Indeed, the fundamental identity
of the Carabineros remains predisposed toward targeting popular movements of the left,
now primarily students, continuing to view them as an internal enemy. Until the
Carabineros’ institution itself recognizes this identity, these national police cannot be the
objective mediators that they claim to be.
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Appendices
1. La Moneda during the bombing, September 11, 19731

2. Varying Accounts of Allende’s Death
The military’s version of Allende’s death on the day of the coup contends that the
president managed to duck out of the Moneda and into the nearby Independence Salon,
where he placed a sub-machine gun between his knees and shot himself in the head.2
According to one account, Allende said: “’I shall defend myself to the end, and the last
bullet of this submachine gun I shall shoot here;’ and the president indicated his own
jaw.”3
Luis Renato González Córdoba, a seventeen-year old GAP member, disputed
these tales of suicide. He gave a rather romanticized tale in which the junta forces shot
Allende in his office and the president gave his dying words: “A leader may fall, but still
there is a cause. America* will be free.”4 This story seems less reliable, especially since
González’s earlier testimonies imply that he had left the Moneda shortly before Allende’s
*

Many South Americans despise the fact that the United States refers to itself as America and
contend that America should only refer to the entirety of the two American continents.
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death.5 Fidel Castro also gave a heroic tale in which Allende suffered a bullet wound in
the stomach in his office, but continued to fire until the “fasc
“fascists”
ists” finally killed him and
riddled his body with bullets.6 One more compelling account from the Columbian Nobel
Prize-winning
winning novelist, Gabriel García Márquez, says that Allende managed to shoot
General Javier Palacios in the hand while shouting “Traitor
“Traitor!”
!” as the general entered the
office. A gang of officers then shot Allende dead and then circled around him, firing into
his corpse until a noncommissioned officer smashed his face with the butt of his rifle.7
It is hard to determine which tale is true be
because
cause they are all based on
circumstantial evidence and each storyteller has obvious motives. On the one hand, the
military wished to show a degree of mercy and humanity, while simultaneously making
Allende appear to be a coward. The stories of Allende’s hheroic
eroic fight to the death, on the
other hand, aimed to make a martyr of the deceased president and dehumanize the junta,
who supposedly riddled his dead corpse with bullets. Suicide certainly does not fit
Allende’s character, as a man who remained at his po
post
st in a burning building, surrounded
by tanks, almost entirely abandoned by the forces that swore to protect him.
Despite the uncertainty about the precise circumstances of his death, clearly Allende was
true to his cause until his bloody end, having just
justified
ified his position by the democratic
process that brought him to power, a process that he deeply believed would protect him.
American Pacific Coast, War of the Pacific (1879
(1879-1883)
3. Map of South-American

8

The black outline defines the Chilean
border after the War of the Pacific ended in
1833. Chile’s previous territory is green,
Bolivia’s is yellow, and Peru’s is orange. The
port of Arica can be seen in the northwest
corner of Chile’s new border,, and Antofagasta
just north of Chile’s old border
border, both
highlighted yellow.
ellow. Most of the nitrate and
copper mines that led heavy foreign influence
in Chile are located in these regions acquired
in 1833.
18304. Major Chilean political parties, 1830
1970.9
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5. Popular Front
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It is important to note, that the Popular Front coalition did not represent a
complete sacrifice of ideology by the four parties involved. In October 1936, the
newspaper La Estrella published an article, “Neither Nazi or Communist,” alluding to
the involved parties’ centrism despite being aligned with the communists. According
to the article,
The fact that the Radical Party...has decided to collaborate within the Popular
Front with communist elements, does not indicate, by any means, that the party
has embraced or accepted the ideas of this collective. More to the point,
radicalism cannot accept the communist theory of transforming the current social
system of the world through revolution.10
The article went on to insist that the “same goes for socialism,” which has built its
platform on fighting the capitalist dictatorship, rejecting the dictatorship of the
proletariat and the military, rejecting Nazism and “wishing for the free function of all
institutions within a democratic system.”11 Thus, the Popular Front is aptly described
as an electoral coalition, but certainly not an ideological one. The parties aligned
against common enemies – Alessandri, the Liberal-Conservative bloc, and the
nacistas – rather than being united in a singular mission.
6. “Se Chupo.” 1938 political cartoon about confiscated by Alessandri.12
This 1938 political cartoon pictures
an artist painting Ibáñez standing over a
cowardly lion with a large whip
(Alessandri was often described as a lion).
The artist’s easel, however, shows a more
ferocious lion that has just eaten
something, apparently Ibáñez, given the
presence of his boot on the floor.
Alessandri stands over the artist’s shoulder
with a desperate expression, steering the depiction in this more favorable direction for
Alessandri’s image. Alessandri ordered the Carabineros to seize and burn the copies of
this edition of the magazine because the cartoon offended him personally.
7. CORFO
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In January 1939, the most catastrophic earthquake in several decades occurred in
Chillán, about 250 miles south of Santiago, and gave President Aguirre and his
constituents an opportunity to implement reform. Between 5,000 and 6,000 people died
as a result of the earthquake, and the government faced the question of how to deal with
over 70,000 now homeless Chileans.13 This catastrophe and the need to reconstruct forced
the right in Congress to approve measures toward rebuilding, and Aguirre used this
leverage to institute economic reform. This led to the narrow approval of a statesponsored development agency, CORFO, which set long-term goals of increased
industrialization and harnessing Chile’s energy resources in the name of reconstruction.
The concessions to the right, which feared CORFO would cause increased taxes on
corporations and the rich, lay in the funding of the organization. No funds for CORFO
could come from these types of taxation, but instead came form U.S. loans and taxation
on U.S. owned copper.14 This meant that the left could not nationalize the copper industry
without loosing the financing for CORFO since they would loose the tax revenue and the
U.S. would likely respond by pulling funding. Nevertheless, the government now had
considerable influence in Chile’s industrial sectors as CORFO immediately became
directly involved with ninety-two companies. While the implementation of CORFO gave
the government a hand in the economy that it previously lacked, the funding for it placed
heavier reliance on foreign investment and copper taxation. Furthermore, much funding
came from printing more Chilean pesos, doubling the money supply between 1939 and
1942. This caused an increase in wholesale prices of 91% and an increase in the cost of
living by 83% in the same period, putting the working classes in an increasingly difficult
situation.15

8. Breakdown of Congressional Seats 1937-65.16
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9. Political Cartoon of President Frei and Fidel Castro.17
The caption here reads, “Frei:
Now you see, Fidel, that I didn’t
need weapons to carry out a
revolution in liberty,” while Frei
gives the peace sign to Fidel
Castro and puts his leg up on a
box that reads, “Absolute
Majority. Votes.” This cartoon
was a way of saying that reform
could be instituted without armed
insurrection while simultaneously attempting to delegitimize communist ideology.
10. Eduardo Frei’s Major Reforms
The results of the 1967 power shift toward the left within the PDC were
immediate as President Frei pushed his reform policies through the legislature. The
first pressing issue was the question of Chilean copper. Much of Chile had believed
for some time that copper mines should be nationalized, and in the 1960s this opinion
spread rapidly due in part to the 1965 conflicts between the U.S. and Chile. Seeking
the middle ground, Frei came to an agreement with the Kennecott Company in 1967
called “Chilenization.” Under this arrangement, Chile obtained 51% of the company
share and paid a sum of $80 million to Kennecott. As for the other major copper
company, Anaconda, they would hold off on such an agreement until 1969, at which
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point the owners accepted Chilenization because demand for full-blown
nationalization became to great to resist reform.18
The other pressing issue was agricultural reform and, finally, the peasant unions
gained some ground. In addition to shifting power in the party system, another factor
that pushed agricultural reform forward in 1967 was rural unionization, which
doubled during the Frei administration (1964-70). Using the 1962 agricultural reform
law allowing the state to purchase and redistribute underutilized land, Frei
expropriated nearly 400 haciendas by mid-1967, but this was still insufficient in the
eyes of the rural unions.19 Then, in July 1967, Frei signed into law a bill that made all
estates of more than 80 “basic hectares”* available for expropriation. This was a step
forward, but the president was still playing the middle ground; most leftist parties and
much of the PDC argued for expropriation of anything greater than 40 basic
hectares.20 Some peasants took matters into their own hands, seizing about 400
haciendas in the last year of Frei’s administration. Still, the president still managed to
legally expropriate 1,300 haciendas by the end of his term.

*

A hectare = 2.47 acres. A “basic hectare” is a measure of land adjusted to its quality of irrigation.
For example, 80 basic hectares could actually equal 80 real hectares if the land was well-irrigated like
the land around Santiago, but could equal 500 hectares if the land was in the north where water was
(and still is) scarce.
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